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ABSTRACT
The charter school movement has been at the forefront of educational reform since the
1990s. The majority of charter school research has focused on academic achievement and
issues of access, equity, and funding. Less attention has focused on charter school
governance, yet evidence suggests that governance challenges represent a significant
impediment to the long-term sustainability of this movement.
This qualitative case study examined the operations of a board of directors in a
conversion charter school. The study included observations of monthly board of directors
meetings over a 16-month period (February 2008-June 2009), interviews with members
of the board of directors and representatives from other key internal and external
constituent groups, and document analysis of official charter school materials, including
minutes, agendas, and historical documents. The period proved to be a turbulent one, with
the resignation of the founding executive director, a failed search for her replacement, the
dissolution of the university partnership, and the resignation of nearly half the board at
the end of the period.
The findings reveal three tensions at the heart of the conversion charter school
governance structure—governance v management, transparency v confidentiality, and
representation v trusteeship. Exploration of these tensions, and the ways they manifested
themselves during the 16-month period, suggest several areas for continuing focus for
both charter school researchers and practitioners: building the leadership capacity of
boards and executive directors; analyzing Sunshine Laws, such as the Brown Act, with an
eye toward helping boards more effectively manage these complex requirements; and

finding ways to proactively and more effectively manage partnerships, particularly
university partnerships.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
Background to the Study
In the winter of 2004-2005, San Diego Middle School (SDMS), a pseudonym,
was forced to make a choice. Following 6 years as a failing school under the federal No
Child Left Behind (NCLB) legislation, the school had to choose one of four fates—it
could allow the district to take it over, it could seek out an outside group to assume
control, it could make some type of fundamental reform involving the restructuring of the
school's governance arrangement, or it could submit a proposal to become a conversion
charter school. The school gathered a working group of teachers, community members,
and parents to consider its options and ultimately decided to petition to become a charter
school. Several months of community education, signature gathering, and bureaucratic
wrangling followed, ultimately ending with a successful petition to the San Diego Unified
School District governing board and the opportunity to become a conversion charter
school starting in the 2005-2006 school year. According to the founding principal, the
desire to become a charter school reflected a desire to be in control, to allow the school to
make its own decisions about how it operated. She recounted the things that the working
committee had described as important in enabling the school to transform itself into their
"dream vision."
One was being in charge of our budget, one was being in charge of our curriculum
and materials, one was being in charge of the calendar and the length of the day
and the instructional design, and, most important, one really was being in charge
of who was here, in the classroom and having some say about that without the
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[California Teachers Union interfering]. (SDMS Principal, interview,
November 8, 2007)
The ensuing years have, by many indicators, proven extremely successful for the school.
Laudatory articles in the press tout the school as one of the only middle schools in
California to pull itself out of program improvement (Alpert, 2008; Merrow, 2007). One
newspaper suggested that the California Department of Education was studying the
school as a model turnaround, quoting a consultant who termed it a "big deal" and a
potential case study for other schools (Alpert, 2008). Violence on campus has
significantly decreased and what the founding principal and others have described as a
campus of chaos has been replaced by a campus order. On the National Public Radio
show NewsHour the founding principal explained, "My first day here, I thought, 'Oh, my
goodness, what am I in for?' At any point in time, I would see 20 to 100 students just
roaming the campus, many stories of setting fires in the bathrooms, destroying property, a
campus of chaos" (Merrow, 2007). A board member echoed her sentiments, explaining
that the founding principal presented data each month about all types of things, including
the number of suspensions. She noted that while it is one or two suspensions per month
now, a few years ago it was hundreds. She also noted that another member of the board of
directors, a police officer for the city schools, consistently reminded the other members
about how much people's perceptions about SDMS had changed. "He always reminds us
how word is out in the community, you're not going to find the police at SDMS, and if
they are there it's because of something that happened down the street, and they are trying
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to protect the school from it" (Member of Board of Directors, interview, November 16,
2007).
Yet the school's early success in some areas does not necessarily tell the whole
story. The publication of the glowing article in a local newspaper, Voice of San Diego, in
June 2008 appeared just as the school entered the most turbulent period in its early
history. The ensuing months have seen the departure of the founding principal, a failed
search to find a replacement, and the dissolution of the partnership between the school
and a local university. The challenges focus attention on school governance issues and
raise questions about the role of the board of directors in the operation of the school.
Between February 2008 and June 2009, the board of directors was comprised of between
11 and 14 members, including local community leaders, parents, faculty members, and
representatives from the school's partner university. These men and women, charged with
hiring and supporting the principal, holding the principal and the school accountable for
its performance, and ensuring the school's fiscal viability and long-term sustainability,
represent a significant yet little understood component of the school's reform efforts. The
board of directors has been engaged during the early years navigating complex
relationships with key external groups (the school district, the school's accounting
educational management organization, the partnering university) and internal groups
(administration, faculty, parents). Moreover, during the 16-month period of this research,
the board found itself at the heart of several significant crises in the life of the school,
crises that had the potential to determine the school's long-term viability. The recent
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events have pulled the board of directors out of the shadows, and have raised questions
about how school governance impacts charter school reform.
Problem Statement
Charter schools have played an increasingly significant role in the educational
reform conversation during the past few years, yet the central role of governance in the
charter school reform effort remains little studied. The vast majority of charter school
failures result from "operational mismanagement and financial difficulties" (Smith,
Wohlstetter, & Brewer, 2007, p. 17), suggesting that the impact of governance on charter
schools is important to understand in order to determine the sustainability of the charter
school movement as a viable long-term reform strategy. Few studies to date however
directly address the role of governance in charter schools or offer insight into how
governance impacts the reform efforts.
Charter school legislation first appeared in Minnesota in 1991 and in California in
1992, and has now spread to 40 states. Nationally, there are more than 3,500 charter
schools, and California has just over 800 charter schools (California Charter Schools
Association, n.d.). At the heart of most charter schools is a charter school board of
directors, While a non-profit structure is not necessarily mandated for charter schools in
California (California Education Code, 2004), the majority of charter schools nationwide
adopt this structure (Henig, Holyoke, Brown, & Lacireno-Paquet, 2005). The board of
directors, representing one part of the classic tripartite non-profit governance system
(board of directors, administrator, staff), is responsible for the fiscal health and long-term
sustainability of the organization. The board of directors also serves as the linchpin that
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connects the internal (administration, faculty, parents) and external (school district,
partnering organizations) worlds of the school. A growing body of charter school
consulting literature has offered guidelines to ensure the successful operation of these
founding boards. Cornell-Feist's (2007) policy brief for the National Association of
Charter School Authorizers (NACSA) is an exemplar, reminding boards that they need to
have a "passionate unwavering belief in the school's mission, full board understanding of
the key charter promises, shared definition of academic excellence, a clear plan to
conduct oversight of the academic program, [and] a clear plan to conduct financial
oversight" (n.p.).
Given their central governance role in so many charter schools, charter school
boards of directors offer an interesting and helpful lens upon which to better understand
the charter school reform effort. Navigating relationships with external groups, such as
school districts, educational management organizations (EMOs), and partnering
universities, the board of directors has primary responsibility for ensuring the
organization's fiscal health and for holding the organization accountable so that it can
continually renew its charter. On the other side, the board of directors needs to hire and
support an executive director and then make sure the school is managed effectively. A
challenging role in any context, the work of a board of directors in a NCLB-conversion
charter school is compounded by the need to support and foster dramatic improvements in
a historically underperforming school. Furthermore, board members, who are often drawn
from the community, may or may not have the skills and experience necessary to navigate
through the sometimes tricky terrain.
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NCLB-Mandated Conversion Charter Schools
Studies have typically lumped charter schools together. Henig et al. (2005)
attempt to rectify this by creating a typology based on founder type, although they note in
the end that type may have little impact on the operations of the schools. As they write,
"the external environment and core educational tasks may impose similar patterns of
behavior on charter schools regardless of their differing organizational roots" (p. 515).
Henig et al. identified seven different varieties—educational management organization
(EMO) only, EMO and other, local business, educators, social service, parent or
community, non-EMO mix. Overarching this framework was a distinction between forprofit and non-profit charter schools, or as they characterized it, mission-driven versus
market-driven schools, with the first two types representing for-profit schools and the
other five representing non-profit schools. Their study suggested the overwhelming
majority of charter schools, more than 80%, are non-profits.
Henig et al.'s (2005) typology fails to account for one of the newest charter school
types, conversion charter schools created as a result of the federal No Child Left Behind
legislation. The No Child Left Behind legislation forces schools that have failed to meet
adequate yearly progress (AYP) for 5 straight years to make a choice in year 6 between:
(i)Reopening the school as a public charter school, (ii) Replacing all or most of
the school staff (which may include the principal) who are relevant to the failure
to make adequate yearly progress, (iii) Entering into a contract with an entity, such
as a private management company, with a demonstrated record of effectiveness, to
operate the public school, (iv) Turning the operation of the school over to the
State educational agency, if permitted under State law and agreed to by the State,
(v) Any other major restructuring of the school's governance arrangement that
makes fundamental reforms, such as significant changes in the school's staffing
and governance, to improve student academic achievement in the school and that
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has substantial promise of enabling the school to make adequate yearly progress
as defined in the State plan under section 111 1(b)(2). (U.S. Department of
Education, 2001, n.p.)
Thus, NCLB-inspired conversion charter schools represent a community-wide Hail Mary
to save a persistently underperforming school. Created under duress, these schools are last
ditch efforts by a community to create success in locations that have consistently
experienced failure.
Smith (2007) notes that very few school districts have actually utilized option "i,"
reopening as a charter, preferring instead to turn to option "v" which he argues allows a
great deal of discretion in its implementation. Indeed, in the San Diego Unified School
District, only 3 of the district's 37 charter schools are conversion charter schools (CCSA
Representative, interview, March 2009). Even if the creation of NCLB-mandated
conversion charter schools remains rare, better understanding these conversion charter
schools and their performance in their early years offers an important avenue into
understanding this school reform option intended to help students in schools that have
faced some of the most persistent challenges within the public education system.
Existing Literature
A number of studies have analyzed various components of the charter school
governance structure. Teske, Schneider, and Cassese (2005) examine the essential role of
authorizing agents in the charter school governance model. Slayton (2002) and Wells,
Vasudeva, Holmes, and Cooper (2002) focus on one particular authorizing agent—the
school district. All three studies raise questions about the current capacity of school
districts to support charter schools, noting the inherent tension in asking school districts
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to provide services for charter schools, which are essentially founded on the philosophical
premise that the traditional school bureaucracy is broken and incapable of creating
successful schools.
A number of studies have unearthed other challenges that charter schools have
faced in the early years. Miron and Nelson (2002), Slayton (2002), Osberg (2006), and
Speakman (2008) point for example to funding inequities that impact charter schools,
noting that charter schools typically receive less money than their public school
counterparts. Hill's (2006) edited volume Charter Schools Against the Odds stresses the
almost heroic quality of charter school reform, which has survived despite a panoply of
obstacles, including inadequate funding, poor facilities, limits on the number of charter
schools allowed in a state, and hostile schools boards and teachers unions. Echoing Hill's
findings, Williams (2007) suggested that charter schools have been actively sabotaged at
every turn by "entrenched school boards, teachers unions, and principals resistant to any
competition" (p. 1).
Scott and Holmes (2002) have argued that charter school reform has actually
exacerbated inequality, by providing less funding to charter schools that, in turn, have less
ability to raise additional funds to cover the gap. As they write, "charter school reform is
unique in that it leaves partially 'public funded' schools starved for resources to pay for
fundamental things, such as buildings and equipment.... Thus, charter schools exist
within a policy framework that leaves them no choice but to scramble for private
resources" (p. 126).
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In the end, the current research suggests that the board of directors is a vital
component of charter school reform, yet little has been done to analyze in depth the role
the board of directors plays. Ultimately, the long-term health and sustainability of the
charter school reform movement hinges, at least in part, on the success of these littleunderstood, and yet extremely influential, governing bodies.
Purpose of the Study
This case study, conducted over a 16-month period, will contribute to our
understanding of charter schools by focusing on the actions of a school board of directors
organized to support an NCLB-mandated conversion charter school. The study will
analyze the work that is undertaken by the board of directors during the school's early
years, paying particular attention to the role the board of directors played in the school's
growth and development. The study will provide insight into some of the challenges
faced by this young charter school, including working with the district office, navigating
relationships with its partner university, and ensuring the school's academic and fiscal
health, and will look at what role the board played in each of these situations. In the end,
the study will attempt to see in practice the results of providing greater autonomy coupled
with increasing accountability that lie at the heart of the charter school experiment.
Research Questions
In order to examine the board of directors' experience, the following research
questions will guide the investigation:
•

What role did the non-profit board of director's play at SDMS? What actions
did they take to reform the school?
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•

How did a non-profit board of directors impact the reform efforts for an
NCLB-mandated conversion charter school?

Sub-questions will include:
•

How does the board of directors interpret its role as governing body for this
charter school? What actions do they take to support the school?

•

How do various constituent groups (administration, faculty, parents) perceive
the board of directors? What are the consequences of these perceptions?

•

What are the primary challenges faced by the school and what role does the
board of directors play vis a vis each of these issues?

•

How does the board of directors manage relationships with key external
groups (school district, the financial EMO, the partnering university) and
internal groups (the executive director, the faculty, and the parents)?

•

How does the board of directors manage its legal and fiduciary
responsibilities?
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CHAPTER 2
REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE
This literature review will bring several different strands of scholarship together in
an attempt to locate this study within the current research on school reform, charter
schools and school governance. The first section will examine the historical roots of the
charter school movement and the place of this movement in the broader context of the
school choice movement. The second section will explore the efforts of scholars and
policymakers to assess the effectiveness of the charter school movement, focusing on the
questions that have driven charter school research and offering insights into both the
strengths and limitations of the current body of work. The final section will provide an
examination of the charter school governance structure. Starting with a brief historical
look at governing boards in general, the section will then explore the different
components of the charter school governance structure, particularly the board of directors
and the attendant challenges that this governance structure creates. A look at the role of
partnerships, specifically university/K12 partnerships, will also be included in the final
section as it offers insight into one of the more complex challenges—managing a
partnership—that can face a charter school board.
Charter School Reform and the School Choice Movement
The charter school reform movement started in the early 1990s. Initial legislation
passed first in Minnesota in 1991 and then California in 1992; by the end of the 20052006 school year, there were more than 3,500 charter schools in 40 states and
Washington, DC (Berends, Springer, & Walberg, 2008; Miron & Nelson, 2002).
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Understanding this relatively new phenomenon has proven exceedingly challenging, as
charter schools represent an extremely diverse set of institutions. As Fuller (2000) notes,
"charter schools are so diverse . . . that it's difficult to advance generalized claims about
this far-flung movement" (p. 4). Furthermore, competing accounts of charter schools,
particularly in the popular press, often present them as, on one hand, an educational silver
bullet or, on the other, an overhyped and unmitigated failure. Thus, despite the
challenges, it is imperative that scholars continue to try to offer a more balanced
explanation.
Charter school reform is one component of the broader school choice movement
that has existed in some form or other for more than 50 years. Bulman and Kirp (1999)
trace the movement's roots to the free-market voucher plan of conservative economist
Milton Friedman back in the 1950s, although they note that choice generated little
political traction until the 1970s when it reappeared in the guise of magnet schools and
opened the possibility of using choice to achieve agendas that extended beyond market
economics, including integration and pedagogical innovation. Bulman and Kirp highlight
efforts like the Milwaukee Parental Choice Program, which was launched in the early
1990s. The program offered public funds to poor inner-city students, allowing them to
enroll in private schools. This program essentially combined market-based and equitybased school reform efforts, and created a rather strange group of bedfellows, bringing
together "liberal black Democrats and conservative white Republicans" (p. 49). The key
concept in this approach as well as several other efforts, as described by scholars like

Coons and Sugarman (1978), was the notion of using choice in the form of vouchers as a
means of increasing equity, not simply as a part of a free-market ideological stance.
Several other scholars emphasize the choice movement's connection to the
broader societal effort to decentralize the state that occurred throughout the early 1990s
(Buckley & Schneider, 2007; Fuller, 2000; Miron, Nelson, & Lubienski, 2002). They
point in particular to Chubb and Moe's (1990) Politics, Markets, and America's Schools,
which offered a "fresh diagnosis of the political constraints strangling public education"
(Fuller, 2000, p. 19). Chubb and Moe advance the proposition that "the specific kinds of
democratic institutions by which American public education has been governed for the
last half century appear to be incompatible with effective schooling" (p. 2). They argued
that current educational reform efforts were doomed from the start for they attempted to
make changes within an institutional structure that was fundamentally flawed. They
suggested that while reformers in many cases accurately identified the elements necessary
for successful schools, such as "clear school goals, rigorous academic standards . . .
strong leadership by the principal, teacher participation in decisionmaking" (p. 16), they
failed to understand what needed to happen in order to create those types of schools.
Chubb and Moe argued for a market-driven system that puts parents and students at the
core, as opposed to the existing system of democratic control which was "governed by an
enormous far-flung constituency in which the interests of parents and students carry no
special status or weight" (p. 35). They envisioned a voucher system geared toward
removing almost all higher level authority from the educational system, and placing
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authority with individual schools that would be free to compete and operate in whatever
manner seemed most effective and would draw the most students.
While some choice advocates touted vouchers, others turned to the concept of
charters. Guided at least in part by the same impetus for market-driven reform as the
voucher advocates, charter advocates envisioned a system that would give parents and
students increased autonomy from the school system itself by creating what Miron et al.
(2002) calls a public/private hybrid that "mixes elements of traditional public schools
(universal access and public funding) with elements usually associated with private
schools (choice, autonomy, and flexibility)" (p. 2). Bulman and Kirp (1999) also stress
the public/private hybrid nature of charter schools.
The arguments of choice advocates have generated resistance. Corwin and
Schneider (2005) decry the hoax being perpetrated on people by voucher and charterschool advocates, arguing that effective school reform is not only possible but preferable
within existing school districts. While recognizing the benefits of parental choice in
schools, they denounce the decision to make these schools separate from the school
district. As they write, "Parents can have the right to choose schools without forcing them
to leave school districts. Independence was an unnecessary add-on—an artifact of freemarket fantasy" (p. 9). Corwin and Schneider point to the extensive reforms tried in
public schools—"preschool programs, middle schools, year-round calendars, magnet
schools, alternative education, school-based management, individual instruction, beforeand after-school interventions, non-graded instruction, team teaching, smaller schools,
and work-study programs"—and suggest that the problem is not an unwillingness to try

reforms but the tendency for these reforms to be "imposed by outsiders who have little
day-to-day stake in schools" (p. 9). Moreover, they suggest that the decision to create
independent charter schools was driven by ideology and, in the end, has derailed what
could have been a broader and more successful school reform effort.
Others have attempted to take a more balanced approach to the issue. Sugarman
and Kemerer's (1999) edited volume offers a number of different lenses upon which to
examine the school choice movement. Henig (1999), for example, lays out the basic
arguments on the two sides of the choice debate. Henig notes that school choice
advocates believe that choice will lead parents to choose schools based on "the quality of
the education they provide" (p. 72), thus rewarding good schools and causing poor
schools to either reform or perish. Critics, on the other hand, predict that "information
about schools will be incomplete, misleading, and unequally distributed" (p. 72). In turn,
they fear the creation of a more segregated society and the creation of schools focused
more on non-educational outcomes—"protecting their children from threatening ideas,"
for example—rather than improving learning outcomes. His conclusions, after reviewing
the studies available to date, suggest that both advocates and critics may be right, and that
policy decisions need to be "unhurried, reasonably cautious, and tied to specific
circumstances" (p. 101). He notes that parents when given the choice tend to be happy
with their decisions, that information gaps do exist, that racial and class biases in access
are quite persistent, but also that when "public policy has intentionally and aggressively
set out to do so, racial and class biases associated with unfettered choice have been
reduced or even reversed" (p. 76).
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Perhaps more importantly, Henig (1999) points out one of the biggest challenges
facing school choice researchers, namely the difficulty of determining if school choice
actually leads to improved academic performance. The crux of the problem lies in the
nature of choice itself. As Henig writes, "The primary source of selection bias is choice.
When subjects are in position to determine whether or not they are exposed to a given
policy instrument, attributes related to that choice—rather than the policy itself- might
account for any difference between them and a comparison group that has not receive the
policy stimulus" (p. 90). In other words, even if the performance of students in choice
schools is shown to be better than students in traditional public schools the characteristics
of these students that led them to choose to attend these schools may be more significant
than anything that the school itself does.
Looking from a slightly different perspective, Sugarman (1999) notes that school
choice may be able to accomplish what years of reform efforts have been unable to
accomplish, namely the elimination of public school finance inequalities. Sugarman and
his fellow school finance reformers have argued for years a simple point—in the current
school funding structure, "wealth matters too much" (p. 114). He points out the inequities
created by a funding model that relies heavily on local income taxes and that results in
significant disparities across districts and states. He also highlights the less often noted
disparities within districts, including inferior facilities and a lower-paid teacher corps.
Sugarman's hope is that school choice will create complexities in this funding scheme
that will drive broader change. For example, he notes, that state funding of charter
schools may become a reality, as charter school operators tire of battling district officials
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and district officials grow leery of funding schools that may draw significant numbers of
students from outside the district. State funding, in turn, may lead to all types of questions
about how to determine appropriate funding levels and, thus, in the end may result in
reforms to funding. Unfortunately, Sugarman also notes the alternative is also possible,
with the result that "conventional school finance arrangements may strangle efforts to
expand choice in the public sector" (p. 124). The possibility that school choice reform
will actually founder on the rocks of school finance is something that will resurface later
in discussions of charter school challenges.
The National Center for the Study of Privatization in Education (NCSPE) at
Teachers College, Columbia University, has sought to provide a theoretical framework to
help understand the broader choice movement. Their framework considers four major
goals for education—freedom of choice, productive efficiency, equity, and social
cohesion (Belfield & Levin, 2005). They note that these goals can be conflicting and thus
there is no one perfect system. While some voucher programs may strongly enhance
freedom of choice and productive efficiency, for example, they may in turn negatively
impact equity and social cohesion. Alternatively, other voucher plans that attempt to
increase equity and social cohesion may have to create some limitations in terms of
choice. Somewhat discouragingly, the authors note that the current research results
concerning privatization are "equivocal" and that, in the end, the results of the debate are
more likely to turn on the political will of powerful constituencies—the teacher's unions
and business interests, for example—rather than on the empirical evidence that
researchers are able to generate (Belfield & Levin, 2005, p. 57).
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Taken together, the school choice literature raises several issues that also emerge
in an analysis of charter schools—the promises represented by choice and increased
autonomy coupled with the challenges of finding effective ways to empirically measure
the actual results of reform efforts; the potential negative impact of choice on equity and
social cohesion; the financial and governance challenges created in the implementation of
new choice systems; the limited ability of schools to handle often unforeseen and poorly
understood roadblocks, and the ultimately devastating effect these challenges can have on
reform efforts.
Assessing the Charter School Reform Movement
While charter schools have taken on different forms in different states, the basic
premise of charter schools has been consistent. From the beginning, charter schools have
made bold promises about what they will be able to accomplish. According to the US
Charter school web site (n.d.), charter schools will:
•
•
•
•
•

Increase opportunities for learning and access to quality education for all
students;
Create choice for parents and students within the public school system;
Provide a system of accountability for results in public education;
Create new professional opportunities for teachers;
Encourage community and parent involvement in public education;

•

Leverage improved public education broadly. (U.S. Charter Schools, n.d., n.p.)

In this section, I will examine two main issues that have constituted the central thrust of
charter school research—academic performance and issues of access and equity.
Academic
The most common—and contentious—area of research has been the effort to track
student performance and determine if charter schools improve academic outcomes. The
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focus on academic results reflects the basic bargain at the core of the charter school
concept—"enhanced autonomy over curriculum, instruction, and operations" in exchange
for increased accountability in terms of student outcomes (Miron & Nelson, 2002, p. 3).
From the beginning, charter school advocates have believed that choice and competition
will lead to more innovative and effective schools. The results, however, have been
mixed; perhaps the most definitive statement that can be made is that additional research
that takes into account the diversity of charter school experiences is still needed.
Several prominent studies have suggested that charter schools are meeting their
goals (Greene, Forster, & Winters, 2003; Hoxby, 2004), while other equally prominent
studies have drawn the exact opposite conclusion (Henig, Holyoke, Lacireno-Paquet, &
Moser, 2001; Nelson, Rosenberg, & Van Meter, 2004). Greene et al. (2003) argued that
in order to be valid a study had to compare "apples to apples." They emphasize that
studies need to compare scores from charter schools and public schools that serve similar
student populations. Using this methodology, the scholars conducted a national empirical
study that measured test score improvements from 11 states in "untargeted charter
schools serving the general population to their closest neighboring regular public schools"
(Greene et al., 2003, p. 1). The results suggested that charter school students performed
"moderately better" than their public school counterparts on both math tests (.08 standard
deviations or about 3 percentile points from the 50th percentile) and reading tests (.04
standard deviations or about 2 percentile points from the 50th percentile). The logic the
researchers employed made sense—it is difficult to compare schools from students
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attending targeted charter schools with other schools since they don't necessarily reflect
the same student population.
While the results were encouraging, however, the limitations of the results are
also noteworthy. As the authors themselves suggest, charter schools that target specific
populations make up a significant portion of the charter school population. The exclusion
of these schools, while perhaps logical within the constraints of their study, effectively
means that the study provides no effective means of measuring the performance of a
significant portion of charter schools. Moreover, the decision to exclude conversion
charter schools—regular public schools that converted into charter schools—seems
capricious. While their rationale may be true in certain context—conversion charter
schools are not necessarily "operating as schools of choice" like other charter schools
since some students attend them simply because they are in the neighborhood—the
decision to exclude conversion charters seems strange as they represent an excellent
means of comparing student performance before and after conversion. Moreover, these
schools reflect typical neighborhood populations, not a targeted community, and thus
offer a helpful means of comparing charter schools to similar neighborhood public
schools. A bigger concern is that the study ignores the impact of selection bias. In other
words, while charter school parents choose to attend their schools, parents at the
neighborhood school typically do not actively choose their school. Research suggests
(Kemerer & Ausbrooks, 1996) that selection bias plays a significant role in determining
student performance in schools.
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Hoxby's (2004) study, one of the most oft-quoted defenses of charter schools to
date, analyzed the data of all charter schools students in the nation. Termed a
"straightforward comparison of charter schools and regular public schools," the study
analyzed the performance of students in charter schools with students in both the nearest
neighborhood public school and the nearest regular public school with a similar racial
composition (in many cases, she notes, these are one and the same). Thus, like Greene et
al. (2003), Hoxby tries to compare students at similar schools. Unlike the Green et al.
(2003) study, however, which looks at the score changes over a 2-year period, Hoxby
only looks at one year's data, comparing reading and math proficiency data from the
2002-2003 school year. The results are heartening for charter school advocates, with
charter students shown to be 4% more likely to be proficient in reading and 2% more
likely to be proficient in math than students from nearby neighborhood public schools.
Moreover, Hoxby shows that the results tend to be even more positive in states where
charter schools are well-established. For example, she notes that in California the
advantage in reading is 8% and the advantage in math is 3%.
Hoxby's study was offered as a rebuttal to the widely discussed Nelson et al.
(2004) study. Funded by the American Federation of Teachers, the latter study set off a
firestorm when it was released. In the opening section of the paper, the authors note that
the release of the National Assessment of Education Progress (NAEP) scores for charter
schools in 2003 had been delayed and then the plan for the report altered. Indeed, at the
time of the study's publication, the results had not yet been released. Despite that, Nelson
et al. with a "combination of intuition, prior knowledge, considerable digging and luck"
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were unable to unearth the results prior to their formal publication (p. 3). With this
dramatic narrative as background, the authors then reveal the "smoking gun"— according
to their analysis, students in charter schools in both grade 4 and grade 8 scored
significantly lower than students in regular public schools. In particular, they note that
among students eligible for the lunch program (a proxy for low SES students) in both
regular public schools and charter schools, students in regular public schools scored
nearly 6 scale points higher in 4th grade math, 7 scale points higher in 4th grade reading,
and 7 scale points higher in 8th grade math.
Both of these studies have significant limitations. Hoxby's (2004) study, while
heartening for charter school advocates, offers only a 1-year snapshot and thus the study
does not capture what type of impact charter schools are having over time. Furthermore,
the wildly different results between different states, as well as the significant differences
between the numbers of students in each state, makes broader conclusions difficult. For
example, Alaskan charter school students are about 20% more likely to be proficient in
reading, while Georgia's charter students are about 6% more likely to be proficient and
North Carolina's charter students are about 4% less likely to be proficient. Nelson et al.
(2004) also focus on a 1-year snapshot. In addition, the scope of their study is extremely
limited, as their results only examine 3% of the students in charter schools. As Hoxby
notes in a critique of the study, "The sample represents about 4 fourth graders in
Connecticut charter schools, 14 in District of Columbia charter schools, 32 in New York
charter schools, and 38 in New Jersey charter schools . . . . Meaningful comparisons
require larger number of students" (n.p.).

Betts and Hill's (2006) "white paper" for the National Charter School Research
Project attempts to navigate through this morass, offering a general assessment of the
methodologies employed in studies to date and providing suggestions for future studies
that will more effectively measure the effectiveness of charter schools. They note that the
primary question driving research into charter school outcomes should not be whether
"the average child in a charter school is learning more or less than the average child in a
district-run public school," but rather whether "students in charter schools are learning
more or less than they would have learned in conventional public schools" (p. 1). The two
main challenges to answering this question are that "it is impossible to observe the same
students simultaneously in both charter schools and the schools they would have attended
had charter schools not been available" (p. 1); and there are many non-school factors that
influence student performance (family background, environment, personal traits) that are
difficult to isolate when studying student outcomes. They review the various types of
studies, noting that each varies in its degree of internal validity- the ability to make
"strong statements about the causal effect of attending a charter school"—and external
validity—the ability to generalize from the results to charter schools in general.
They point out several types of studies that are particularly ineffective or
questionable, including school-level analyses that compare average student test scores
across schools at a single point in time, school-level analyses that compare trends over
time in average student test scores, and student-level comparisons of test scores at a
single point in time. While they note the final model has some advantages over the other
two—it at least links an individual student's achievement to his background

characteristics—this approach "ignores the history of each student, and ignores
differences in rates of learning between one student and another" (Betts & Hill, 2006,
p. 12). The first two approaches, on the other hand, ignore the impact of compositional
changes in schools, thus making it difficult to draw conclusions from the data without
knowing if student movement in and out of schools is driving much of the change.
In contrast, Betts and Hill (2006) suggest that individual student studies of valueadded and experimental studies that use lotteries to define a comparison group are
significantly more effective, although not without their own limitations. The former
approach, which has been increasingly prominent, attempts to measure trends over time
by comparing where a student begins on the achievement spectrum with where they end
up after a set period of time. As Betts and Hill note, this approach still does not perfectly
control for "unobserved characteristics" that make comparisons between students at
charter schools and regular public schools misleading. The latter approach, on the other
hand, provides a "quasi-experiment" which gets as close as possible to providing a
randomized sample, which can be used to compare students who attended the charter and
students who applied but were denied admission.
While the internal validity of this model is quite high, the external validity is
questionable. As Betts and Hill (2006) note, charter schools that employ a lottery are
clearly popular schools and thus might not be particularly representative of charter
schools in general. In addition, the students who apply to charter schools may not
represent the typical student. Indeed, one might assume that students and their families
applying to charter schools may actually be more motivated and have greater family
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support than the typical student, thus raising questions about whether better results for
these students will actually translate into better results for other, perhaps more generally
representative, students who attended the same school.
Practically speaking, these types of studies are also hard to conduct and the
number of sample schools is limited. Indeed, as of 2006, only two such studies existed
(Hoxby & Rockoff, 2005; McClure, Strick, Jacob-Almeida, & Reicher, 2005). It is worth
noting while the Hoxby and Rockoff (2005) study shows significant advantages for the
students who attended the charter schools, the McClure et al. (2005) study shows that
students at regular public schools and charter schools had in essence identical results. The
latter study, which was conducted at the Preuss School in San Diego, suggested there
were other benefits that students gained from attending Preuss—Preuss students
completed more courses required for admission to UC/CSU schools, for example - yet its
results fall short of the ringing endorsement sought by at least some charter school
advocates.
These studies also do not account for the role of selection bias. A study of schools
in San Antonio (Kemerer & Ausbrooks, 1996) suggests that students who are not selected
often receive a negative impression of themselves and, in turn, do worse in school. This
study raises serious questions about the possibility of creating any study which can
meaningfully compare student performance in charter schools to student performance in
public schools.
The final conclusion reached by Betts and Hill (2006) places student outcome
research in a helpful perspective. There are clearly some studies that offer little, if any,

helpful results for policymakers. Studies that attempt to track student performance at the
school level, for example, have significant limitations and thus are likely to provide little
in the way of meaningful feedback. Studies that track student performance over time and
lottery-based studies, however, have strengths that make them helpful for understanding
charter schools but also have limitations that make them far from perfect in determining
the effectiveness of the charter-school reform effort. Perhaps most importantly, Betts and
Hill point to the dearth of good data, something which can only be rectified by the
willingness of district and state school boards and funders to step in and ensure that
longitudinal data of student test scores and other key demographic information—racial
and ethnic identity, family income, place of residence—are available.
Hassel and Terrell (2006) offer a strikingly similar analysis to Betts and Hill
(2006). In Charter School Achievement: What We Know, Hassel and Terrell review 58
comparative analyses of charter school and traditional public school performance. They
find that 25 of the 58 studies look only at a snapshot and provide mixed and not
especially meaningful results. On the other hand, they argue that the 33 studies that track
change over time are, at the least, encouraging. Only 4 of the studies show charter schools
lagging behind, while 16 find overall gains that were larger than public school gains, 7
find higher gains in certain categories of schools—such as schools serving at risk
students, and 6 find comparable gains between charter schools and regular public schools.
Their main conclusion in terms of student achievement mirrors Betts and Hill—"we need
many more studies that track individual students over time, ideally in a randomized
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experimental setting, but at the very least using sophisticated methods to attribute valueadded" (Hassel & Terrell, 2006, p. 10).
Access and Equity
While much of the public debate has centered on the performance of charter
schools, a number of scholars have also turned their attention to questions of access and
equity. As noted in the initial discussion of school choice, one of the common concerns
has been that increased school choice will lead to increasingly segregated schools. Thus,
while charter schools hold out the promise of providing quality education for all students,
the limited enrollment and the need to select students has consistently raised the specter
that charter schools will in the end create a system where public funds will be used
without providing equal access to all students. Concerns about skimming the top students
from public schools, for example, have been voiced since the earliest years of school
choice and charter school reform. Related to this question about access is a growing
concern about issues of equity between charter schools and regular public schools.
Scholars are also increasingly raising questions about the lower levels of funding received
by charter schools and thus in turn creating even greater inequity in low-income
communities that have, ironically, embraced charter school reform as a means of
increasing equity (Scott & Holmes, 2002).
Some scholars have voiced concerns about the creation of public schools that
serve increasingly targeted communities and, in turn, risk creating greater inequity in the
broader society. Fuller (2000), for example, described it as "an isolationist rendition of
village republicanism" (p. 28), in which local communities eagerly seek the opportunity
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to control their own schools and thus build a stronger sense of local community. The
intoxicating power of local control reflects the analysis of scholars like Chubb and Moe
(1990) that institutions like the state and district offices are irreparably broken. In the
process of embracing community-based charter schools, however, communities risk
allowing the broader society to ignore the pressing issues of structural inequality. As
Fuller writes, "it denies the fact that only in a larger public square can the structural
(cross-community) causes of inequality be addressed: family poverty, the hollowing out
of inner cities, and resulting inequities in how schools are financed" (p. 8). Fuller is not
suggesting that charter schools do not potentially have a powerful place in school reform,
but he does note that they must "balance tribal cohesion with democratic discourse"
(p. 236).
The research, although limited, would seem to suggest that Fuller's (2000)
concern is not entirely misplaced. Several studies have found that charter schools receive
less money than regular public schools (Miron & Nelson, 2002; Slayton, 2002;
Speakman, 2008). Speakman's (2008) study makes the strongest claims. Speakman
(2008) shows that time and again charter schools receive less money than the regular
public schools. Speakman's (2008) analysis reveals the gap is not because schools receive
fewer state dollars but rather a result of local and facility funds that regular public schools
receive but that are not readily available to charter schools. As she notes, "the evidence
shows that the states fail to compensate fully for these disparities, even though they are
the primary flinders for charter schools" (p. 97).

Scott and Holmes (2002) add to concerns about unequal funding with public
dollars with an examination of the challenges charter schools face to secure additional
sources of funding. They argue that charter school reform has actually magnified "preexisting inequalities across communities, and unequal access to resource-rich social
networks" (p. 106). In other words, rather than creating greater access to improved
education for low-income communities it has exacerbated the inequities between
wealthier and poorer communities. The reason for this is the limited number of strong ties
between low-income communities and sources of private funding (strong ties are
connections between family and close friends), and thus the heavy reliance on weak ties
to secure additional sources of revenue. While some charter schools have been successful
in creating and sustaining those connections, they emphasize that chronic underfunding
from public sources makes these connections not simply helpful but rather essential for
charter school survival. As they write, "charter school reform is unique in that it leaves
partially 'public funded' schools starved for resources to pay for fundamental things, such
as buildings and equipment.... Thus, charter schools exist within a policy framework
that leaves them no choice but to scramble for private resources" (p. 126).
While funding inequities have been shown to be real, the concern of social sorting
or that charter schools are somehow skimming students from other public schools has for
the most part proven to be unfounded. Miron and Nelson (2002) note, for example, that
"figures do not provide evidence of social sorting" (p. 75), while Zimmer and Buddin
(2008) conclude, "The evidence shows that charter schools have not created 'white
enclaves' or skimmed high-quality students from traditional public schools" (p. 190).
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Indeed, the results, if anything, simply reinforce the concerns expressed by Fuller and
others. As Zimmer and Buddin note, "In fact, charter schools have proven to be more
popular among black and lower achieving students and may have actually created 'black
enclaves'" (p. 190). Wells (2002) points out further that charter schools are in some cases
increasing racial and social class segregation.
The increasing segregation of schools is, of course, not limited to charter schools.
The Harvard Civil Rights Project has released several significant reports in the last
decade that have shed light on the increasing segregation in schools. Orfield and Yun
(1999) noted four major trends in schools, including the resegregation of the American
South, the increasing segregation of Latino students, increasing minority enrollment in
suburban schools coupled with increasing segregation within those communities, and the
persistent finding that while other racial groups, including African American and Latino
students, are experiencing some diversity in their schools, whites remain in
"overwhelmingly white schools" (p. 3). A more narrowly tailored study was later released
by Reardon and Yun (2002) that noted "segregation levels are quite high in private
schools, particularly among Catholic and other religious schools" (p. 3). Their research
revealed that black-white segregation is greater among private schools than among public
schools, while Latino-white segregation is less among private schools than among public
schools. As Reardon and Yun (2002) wrote, the reasons for segregation are not
necessarily clear, but the evidence does strongly suggest that "private schools, as now
operated, are not a significant answer to the problems caused by intensifying racial
isolation in public schools as desegregation is abandoned" (p. 8).
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The importance of better understanding the reasons for these choices may be
significant, as evidence by studies that have shown that "assessments of school quality
appear to be based primarily on the race of the students enrolled" and that the "percentage
of minority students enrolled in the public schools has a significant effect on the decision
of white parents to enroll their children in private schools" (Levin, 1999, pp. 280-281).
Godwin and Kemerer (2002) make the broader point that families who choose school
choice options are different from families who do not make the choice, and that
unfettered choice will lead to increased segregation on the basis of academic ability and
family involvement. They also note that studies of choice suggest that it leads to some
level of skimming and a slight increase in segregation by income and ethnicity, although
they are quick to point out that the levels are actually lower than the effects that occur
through residential choice (the decision of people to move to a different area so their child
can attend a different school).
What are the takeaways for charter schools? Studies clearly show that charter
schools, and other types of school choice, have not contributed significantly more than
other factors such as residential choice to school segregation, but they have also not
effectively resolved issues of access and equity that remain so salient, particularly within
inner city schools.
Charter School Governance
As noted earlier, charter school reform is at its core a reform in the governance
model. In this section, I will briefly review the governance structure in use in charter
schools, with particular attention to the role of authorizers and charter school governing
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boards. While much of the charter school scholarship has focused on measuring student
achievement and determining how effective charter schools have been, the real issue may
be the challenges that are created by the charter school governance model and the support
it offers or the impediments it can create for this type of school reform. These challenges,
including fiscal sustainability and management, effective oversight of program, and
maintenance of relationships with external groups, are undoubtedly most pronounced in
low-income communities, revealing yet again the difficulty of creating meaningful and
sustainable school reform for our most needy students.
Charter School Governance Structures
The complexity of charter school governance starts at the top of the organizational
structure. The initial power rests in the hands of authorizing agents. There are several
primary authorizing agents, including local district school boards, state boards of
education, universities, and state chartering authorities. As Teske et al. (2005) note only
somewhat tongue-in-cheek, "the practice of creating, overseeing, and renewing or closing
charter schools is evolving in a typically complicated American policy environment about
which much is speculated and little is really known" (p. 130). Authorizing agents are
responsible for accepting applications, reviewing them, approving them, and then holding
the school accountable through subsequent renewals and, if necessary, closure, if the
school is not meeting expectations. Not all states have the same authorizing agents.
California, for example, only allows local school boards, county boards of education, and
the state board of education to authorize charters, while Minnesota has a variety of
authorizing agents, including universities. As will be noted in more detail later, however,
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while California does not allow universities to serve as authorizers, there are a number of
universities that have supported charter schools or served as partners in charter school
ventures.
In most cases, the main governing body for each charter school is an independent
board of directors. There are very few studies that have focused on charter school boards
of directors, yet this group is essential in determining the success or failure of the school.
Similar to a board of directors in other non-profit organizations, charter school boards
represent a key part of the classic tripartite system of governing (Houle, 1997). In the
simplest terms, the board of directors is "an organized group of people with the authority
collectively to control and foster an institution that is usually administered by a qualified
executive and staff' (Houle, 1997, p. 6). Key tenets of board operation include a
recognition that the main work of the board should be spent "supporting the institution,
not in controlling it" and that while the board has ultimate authority they should "exercise
it as rarely as possible" (p. 7). In addition, the board is only "formally alive" when it is
holding an official session. Houle (1997) also highlights other tensions inherent in board
work, including the need to have a board that represents various constituencies yet board
members who are focused on the collective mission not the needs of interest groups. As
another example, Houle (1997) notes the oft-cited and at least partially true perception
that a board can be a "group of part-time nonspecialist people who behave in
idiosyncratic ways and are chosen according to no known system of merit ranking (other
than, perhaps, wealth or social position)" (p. 95). In other words, Houle (1997) is
emphasizing that boards hold a great deal of power yet membership is not necessarily

34
based on expertise or understanding, but rather on the ability of people to help an
organization raise money or the desire of someone to be on a board to raise their own
social status.
Houle's (1997) exploration of governing board uncovers issues that clearly arise
within the charter school realm—conflicts between boards of directors and school
administrators, confusion over appropriate roles for various groups within the tripartite
system, relationships with external groups such as school boards and authorizing
agencies, and questions about the value of having an independent board of directors. As
Houle writes, some people have argued that the board structure itself is fundamentally
flawed, a concept somewhat akin to the argument made by Chubb and Moe (1990) and
others against the institutional structure of schooling. The issue of a fundamental flaw in
the board structure is one worth revisiting as one takes a closer look at the challenges that
have arisen within charter school governance models.
Up to this point, however, the focus for most charter schools has not been on the
efficacy of the charter school governance model but rather on finding ways to help the
governance model function smoothly. The concepts for good governance, as presented in
standard non-profit governance guidebooks (Houle, 1997; Laughlin & Andringa, 2007),
are similar to the suggestions made by charter school supporters, such as the National
Association of Charter School Authorizers (NACSA). The NACSA regularly publishes
issue briefs focused on creating effective founding boards for charter schools, for
example, and have highlighted what the NACSA sees as the key components of
successful boards: "passionate unwavering belief in the school's mission, full board
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understanding of the key charter promises, shared definition of academic excellence, a
clear plan to conduct oversight of the academic program, (and) a clear plan to conduct
financial oversight" (Cornell-Feist, 2007, n.p.). This particular brief also emphasized the
importance of creating clear roles and responsibilities vis a vis the board, the school
leader, teachers, and parents and students.
At the heart of effective charter school governance is recognizing the trade-off
being made between autonomy and accountability. In return for increased autonomy,
charter schools are agreeing to an increased level of accountability. Thus, as noted earlier,
one of the biggest challenges facing charter school authorizers and, in turn, charter school
board of directors is determining effective ways to ensure that the schools are effectively
meeting their missions. Hill (2004) notes that three conditions exist within the chartering
structure that promotes accountability—"performance incentives, freedom of action, and
investments in school capacity" (p. 94). He points to the Massachusetts State Board of
Education, the Chicago district charter office, the Charter School Development Center in
Sacramento, and the NACSA as model groups that have implemented elements of
effective accountability structures, such as training staff to "monitor data and set policy
direction, not create directives," using "inspectorates and self-assessment processes," and
"learning to negotiate performance agreements that take account of a school's unique
focus and goals without sacrificing bottom-line objective measures" (pp. 95-96). He also
asserts that charter schools benefit from being accountable not only to authorizers but to
other consitutent groups, including parents, staff, and private donors. Hill's (2004)
optimistic assessment while perhaps not totally misplaced conflates two roles—the role
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of the school principal/founder and the role of the board of directors—vis- a-vis these
other constituent groups. In addition, Hill's assessment emphasizes the importance of the
authorizing agent, a role that has, like board of directors, been little studied up to this
point. One of the few studies uncovered by this author, the study by Teske et al. (2005)
discussed earlier, revealed that local school boards are likely to be more hostile to charter
schools than other authorizers, and, more importantly, that local boards are ineffective in
their ability to monitor charter schools. Teske et al. point out that the limited oversight
may just as likely reflect incompetence and over-stressed school boards, as it does
conscious anti-competitive activity. Thus, while Hill sees reason for hope, the limited
studies on the ground suggest that the governance model presents some serious
difficulties for charter school operators.
Focusing In on Challenges of the Governance Model
Clearly, one of the great promises of charter school reform was the opportunity for
schools to have increased autonomy from state and district bureaucracies. The intervening
years, however, have revealed that this autonomy has resulted in serious challenges in
terms of governance. Wells (2002) rails against what she sees as charter school policies
that do not adequately support charter school operators. In other words, she contends that
the rhetoric of autonomy has not matched the reality of charter school laws. In particular,
she contends, "[state policies] generally fail to support the efforts of committed educators,
especially those serving the most disadvantaged students in grassroots and non-profit
charter schools" (p. 3). She points to three main things "ambiguity, lack of support, and
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the complete absence of equity provisions within the charter school laws in most states"
(p. 3)—as the main cause of what she foresees as yet another failed school reform effort.
As noted in earlier discussions of access and equity, charter schools have been
consistently underfunded in comparison with regular public schools. The underfunding
stems, at least in part, from the Herculean task involved with being a charter school
principal and the lack of preparation that most of these leaders received for this new role.
Indeed, principals need not only to fulfill the traditional role that emphasized instructional
leadership and the creation of a clear educational direction for the school, but they also
must navigate the complex and sometimes contentious world of school finance, oversee
the challenging process of non-profit fundraising, and ensure an effective working
relationship between the school and the district. Slayton (2002) points out that it is, in the
end, the "savvy and know-how—or lack, thereof—of the charter school administrators"
that determines a school's funding and how it addresses key questions such as "whether a
charter school pays oversight and service costs to its districts, whether a district provides
a facility for its charter school or schools, and whether a charter school pays for any of the
school district's additional special education costs" (p. 81). This relationship between
school districts and charter schools, while not extensively studied, represents an
important factor that clearly contributes to the success or failure of charter school efforts.
Wells et al. (2002) shift the focus a bit by examining the relationship from the
perspective of one of the primary authorizing agents, the school district. They note the
strange situation that school districts often find themselves in as they are "freeing
individual schools from their own bureaucracy, while continuing to argue that that very
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bureaucracy is legitimate and necessary" (pp. 29-30). Moreover, they found that in 7 of
the 10 districts they studied, charter school founders and operators brought a "strong antipublic school ideology" (p. 32). Their examination of this relationship revealed that
school districts have little idea of what their role is or how they should most effectively
play it. Many of their decisions were driven by concerns about liability, as districts
worried that problems at a charter school could, in the end, bankrupt or financially
jeopardize the district. Furthermore, efforts to create accountability typically focused on
fiscal issues, not academics. As the authors note, this focus reflects the traditional
strength of school districts, as they have typically been able to exercise fiscal authority
but have never "been very good at holding schools accountable for academic outcomes"
(p. 44).
Carnochan (2002) builds on this work by arguing that decentralization "is a
complex reform strategy with different effects on different levels of government, different
domains, and different constituents" (p. 58). Looking at the experiences of three charter
schools, Carnochan reveals not only the complexity of the district/school relationship, but
also the challenges of other types of relationships—the relationships between schools and
parents, school and partnering universities, and administrators and faculty—that surface
amidst these changes in governance. For example, she describes a school that developed a
partnership with a non-profit organization that ultimately left one teacher feeling like she
had gone "from one dictatorship to another" (p. 610). In essence, she noted, while charter
schools seemed to value the autonomy over governance structures, "the data suggests that
decentralized schools experienced high levels of conflict under new governance
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structures, with staff and communities often battling over who would steer the schools"
(p. 70).
Hill and Lake (2008) take the argument even one step further, contending that the
non-profit structure prescribed by state law has seriously inhibited the ability of charter
schools to successfully reform. Mirroring the findings of Wells et al. (2002), Hill and
Lake find that districts are not "prepared or eager to understand their role" (p. 116). In
particular, they point out that districts are not currently organized to provide the
contracting and oversight expected in their new role, as opposed to the vertical
management more traditionally required in regular public schools. In order to be
successful, they argue that school districts must develop several main capacities:
Organizations using third parties to do essential work must know exactly what
results they need, be able to tell the difference between a provider capable of
delivering results and one that is not, be able to identify problems in provider
performance early enough to intervene before bad results are inevitable, work
constantly to build or identify other suppliers to keep current ones under
competitive pressure, and replace providers in case of low performance. (Hill &
Lake, 2008, p. 116)
Given this challenging context where districts are incapable of providing adequate
support, they then decry state laws that mandate charter schools adopt a non-profit
structure. They point out that the communities served by the schools often do not have
people with the time or expertise needed to serve on charter school boards, and thus can
be filled with activist parents or with board members who do not clearly understand "the
limitations of board members or the need for clear delegation to management" (p. 121).
Furthermore, they stress that traditional public school leadership training does not provide
the expertise needed by charter school administrators for these positions. They argue that
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schools should be able to adopt different types of models, including sole proprietorships,
partnerships, or board-governed corporations. In addition, they call for increased funding
and the development of additional capacity for district offices so they can more
effectively play their role vis a vis charter schools.
The common link of these different studies seems to be the limited understanding
of what is really happening with charter school reforms from a governance perspective as
well as a lack of consensus about the ideal structure or structures that should be
considered if people are going to ensure the long-term viability of charter school reform.
Indeed, these studies suggest that while people consistently describe charter schools as
having increased autonomy, the serious governance challenges faced by many of these
schools raises questions about how much autonomy these schools actually have. Indeed,
in many cases, charter schools may simply be replacing one dysfunctional governance
model with another.
Relationships with Partner Organizations
The creation of partnerships with universities, businesses, non-profit
organizations, and other community institutions has represented another important link in
the charter school reform movement. While charter school partnerships have also not
been extensively studied, the literature surrounding partnerships in general, and university
partnerships in particular, sheds additional insight into the types of challenges underlying
the charter school governance model. Much like charter school reform itself, partnerships
have consistently held out great promise and have been introduced with much fanfare, yet
their implementation has been complex and the results have not always been positive. In
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particular, the optimism surrounding school-university partnerships has been noteworthy.
The need to link higher education with K-12 education seems self-evident when the topic
is raised, but the success of these ventures has been mixed.
Sanders (2006) offers a helpful conceptual framework for understanding the
myriad of different partnerships that exist. Noting the types of arguments that have been
traditionally been made in favor of collaboration—need for additional human and
material resources, the opportunity to increase "students' social capital through their
connections with students' communities" (p. 3), and the need to break down the
anachronistic isolation of schools in an increasingly integrated and diverse world—she
suggests that people need to recognize a continuum of partnerships. On one end, she
describes simple community partnerships, which she characterizes as short term and
which involve unidirectional exchange, low levels of interaction, and limited planning.
On the other end of the spectrum, she describes complex partnerships, which are long
term and which involve bi- or even multi-directional exchange, a high level of
interaction, and extensive planning and coordination (pp. 8-9). While the latter are
significantly more difficult to sustain she is quick to point out that the positive outcomes
are much greater.
Sanders (2006) offers an analysis of the major obstacles identified in complex
school-community partnerships. She mentions Cushing and Kohl's (1997) work which
identified fear of public scrutiny, staff burnout, and teachers' and administrators' negative
perceptions of students' families and communities; Mawhinney's (1994) and Epstein's
(1995) works that identify territorialism; and Crowson & Boyd's (1993) work that

identifies "unresolved issues of information sharing, resource mingling and professional
turf' (Crowson & Boyd, p. 152). She adds her own list of obstacles, including
participation, lack of time, community resources, leadership, funding, communication,
and focus. While the list may seem exhaustive and perhaps exhausting to understand, she
concludes by suggesting three main factors that seem to impact the overall effectiveness
of school-community collaborations: "a shared vision, clearly defined roles and
responsibilities, and open communication" (p. 25). These three main factors sound,
perhaps not surprisingly, remarkably similar to the concepts of good governance as
suggested in both the non-profit and charter school governance literature. She also notes
five main components of successful community partnerships include a high-functioning
school, a student-centered environment, effective partnership team, principal leadership,
and external support. Most noteworthy, and perhaps most troubling, for the many
proponents of partnerships is her emphasis on high-functioning schools. The notion that
good schools with many resources are the most likely to benefit from partnerships, while
at some level obvious, suggests that the schools that most need these partnerships because
they have minimal access to resources are the very places that are least likely to be able to
effectively capitalize on these opportunities.
Cordeiro and Kolek (1996) examine the intersection between school leadership
and educational partnerships. In the introduction, Cordeiro and Kolek identify five key
factors for successful partnerships—leadership, trust, stability, readiness, and a common
agenda. They also introduce the concept of a comprador. "A Portuguese word . .. [that]
literally means 'buyer,'" Cordeiro and Kolek note that the term was used in China to
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denote people "who acted as liaisons between foreign firms and Chinese officials'"
(Cheng, 1986, p. 281, cited in Cordeiro & Kolek, 1996, p. 13). In their usage, a
comprador is a person who is able to navigate across the boundaries that exist between
different organizations. The need to develop the capacity of educational leaders to be "bior multi-lingual and cultural" (p. 13) is imperative if partnerships are going to develop
truly reciprocal relationships and collaborative cultures.
Restine's (1996) chapter on partnerships between schools and higher education
institutions provides a helpful transition between the general concept of school
partnerships and the more specific concept of school-university partnerships. Restine
emphasizes the possibilities school-university partnerships have for "reinventing and
revitalizing education across the country" (p. 34), but also cautions about the significant
cultural differences between the two types of organizations. While "universities value
norms based on generalizations about schools and teaching . . . schools prefer norms that
have an application in a material context" (p. 36). Furthermore, she mentions Klein's
(1990) list of seven predictable barriers to collaboration: "the illusion of consensus,
failure to negotiate a common working vocabulary, open conflict over status, too large a
group, equating mission with vision, neglecting the need for designated leadership, and
failing to involve students, faculty, parents and practitioners" (p. 37). The absence of
leaders, or compradors, who understand these barriers and the importance of negotiating
across the different cultures can be a recipe for disaster.
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School-University Partnerships
Sirotnik and Goodlad's (1988) edited volume offers the logical starting place for
analyzing school-university partnerships. The volume emphasizes the vast, yet still
unrealized, potential available through school-university partnerships. Goodlad (1988),
for example, notes how one of the essentials of professional renewal—the "continuous
infusion of both relevant knowledge and alternative (indeed, countervailing) ideas for
practice stemming from inquiry into the enterprise" (p. 11)—is often missing from
schools, yet seemingly available through more effective collaboration with university
partners. Despite that, he argues, "the joining of schools (and school districts) and
universities in commonly purposive and mutually beneficial linkages is a virtually untried
and, therefore, unstudied phenomenon" (p. 12). Goodlad also notes that the promise of
these partnerships is in large part due to the existence of two very different cultures. He
invokes McNeill's (1986, p. 16) argument that "throughout civilization fundamental
change tends to be the result of different cultures impinging on one another" (cited in
Goodlad, 1988, p. 13), noting that universities and schools "differ in purpose, function,
structure, clientele, reward systems, rules and regulations, ambience, ethos" (Goodlad,
p. 14).
Goodlad (1988) ultimately argues for a symbiotic view of partnership—"two
different kinds of organisms (institutions) are joining for the satisfaction of mutual selfinterests" (p. 23). He emphasizes that it must be both selfless and self-serving if the
partnership is going to succeed. In other words, a symbiotic relationship only succeeds if
both organisms have something the other wants and needs. The volume includes case
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studies of different partnerships, and then concludes with a synthesis from Sirotnik and
Goodlad that offers seven tentative and "highly speculative observations" (p. 219).
First, the role of executive director may prove to be crucial.... Second, whatever
the governance structure initially established, it will create problems and probably
will require later modification . . . . Third, the disparity between the rhetoric of
expectation and the financial commitment of school-university partnerships raises
interesting questions about the future . . . . Fourth, questions of involvement,
participation, and representation must be resolved on shared turf: the individual
school, on one hand, and the university's programs for preparing educators, on the
other . . . . Fifth, for this time, energy, and motivation to be poured into creating
parallel programs is to assure failure . . . . Sixth, if the necessary mechanisms are
to be sensitively nurtured, the partnership must become self-conscious of the
change process . . . . Seventh, the ultimate indicators of the success of a schooluniversity partnership are not what gets marked up on the scoreboard, however
important short-term accomplishments are as motivators. The nature and quality
of institutional and individual renewal serves as the source for determining
evaluative indicators, (pp. 219-224)
In essence, Sirotnik and Goodlad's volume served as a clarion call for increasing schooluniversity partnerships. While recognizing the many obstacles to these partnerships and
the potential for failure, they argued that the future of educational renewal is at least in
part dependant on the creation and proliferation of these types of collaborative
opportunities.
One of the most notable school-university partnership models that has developed
in the intervening years—the Professional Development School (PDS)—offers ample
evidence of both the promise and pitfalls of partnerships. Levine and Trachtman (1997)
note that while antecedents can be found in things such as John Dewey's Laboratory
School, the current movement owes its impetus to groups such as the Holmes Group and
the National Network for Educational Renewal, the latter initiated by Goodlad (Levine &
Trachtman, p. 1). PDSs offer a prime example of Sanders' concept of complex
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partnership. Several works capture the early excitement represented in these ventures
(Darling-Hammond, 1994; Levine, 1997). PDSs represent the confluence of several key
concepts—the professionalization of teaching, the immense potential available from
school-university partnerships, the focus on developing new models for what Sarason
called the "regularities of schooling—time, space, resources, roles, and relationships"
(cited in Levine & Trachtman, p. 4), and the desire to improve schools particularly in
poor, urban areas. Perhaps the most powerful recurring metaphor is the concept of
creating an educational model based on the medical model; in other words, schools
modeled after teaching hospitals where doctors have created a living laboratory that
integrates research, practice, and training in one institution. In essence, PDS's are focused
on four main goals: improvement of student learning, preparation of educators,
professional development of teachers, and research and inquiry into improving practice
(Teitel, 2003).
The challenges of PDSs have been evident from the beginning. Teitel (2003)
provides a comprehensive review of PDSs and suggests important learning that can be
applied to continuing efforts. He emphasizes two different stages—start-up challenges
and challenges in sustainability. During the early stages, organizations are forced to
confront both their own culture and the culture of the partnering organization and to ask
whether or not the two are good partners for each other. He refers to Saphier and King's
(1985) 12 norms for strong cultures, which includes collegiality, high expectations, trust
and confidence, open communications, and tangible support, and emphasizes the need for
both organizations to understand how the two different organizations currently operate
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and how that will impact a partnership. He emphasizes the importance of developing
trust, and also cautions about the larger contextual issues—the environment in which the
partnership is being formed—and the unforeseen consequences that context can have in
the process of forming the partnership.
As the partnership moves out of the start-up stage, he emphasizes the importance
of creating permanent changes in the governance structure that support the new
partnership as well as developing a critical mass of people involved in both organizations
that are engaged in the partnering process. He also points out that while the ultimate goal
of PDSs is student learning, many of the challenges that are faced on a day-to-day basis
are more focused on adults. As he writes, "the issues and challenges of collaboration
seem to be less about students and their learning and more about the adults and how to
best build relationships among them" (Teitel, 2003, p. 24).
Johnston (1997) offers one of the more interesting and thought-provoking
perspectives on collaboration. Focusing on 6 years of partnership between Ohio State
University and several elementary and middle schools that joined together as Educators
for Collaborative Change, the book is a series of essays edited by Johnston. The authors
adopt a post-modern lens to deconstruct the complex relationships that evolved between
the different individuals and institutions. They argue that their most profound learning
involved the recognition that the tensions that exist between schools and universities
rather than representing points of conflict needing to be resolved "are instead to be
cherished as potential sites for learning and growth" (p. 12). They continue, "When there
were differences, we had to reflect, compare, and adjust our thinking in light of someone
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else's perspective. When our differences exist in this kind of productive tension, learning
is most likely to occur" (p. 13).
The challenge in this is immediately evident, as the process they describe requires
extensive conversations and time for reflection. Clearly, not everyone was as eager as
Johnston and some of the others to engage in this type of exercise, as they note that some
people became frustrated by the focus on conversation at what they perceived to be the
cost of action. "All this talk about tensions is driving me crazy—tensions, tensions,
tensions. Meanwhile, things at my school are falling apart. There must be a better way to
talk about what's going on in this PDS" (Johnston, 1997, p. 19). This process also
surfaced the significant cultural differences between the two institutions. As Johnston
(1997) writes:
We have come to appreciate the striking differences between schools and
universities with respect to asserting disagreements. Many teachers feel that their
schools are not safe places to disagree. If you object to something or disagree with
a colleague, you are considered uncooperative or aggressive. At the university, it
is expected that you will offer your ideas and heartily debate issues. Professors,
much more than teachers, are rewarded for idiosyncratic ideas, and personal
opinions are expected, (p. 39)
The process also raises questions of privilege and priority. The collaborative
process employed by the PDS reflected a differing sense of time.
Time is a variable of privilege. If the collaborative process takes an excessive
amount of time (which it almost always does), then it tips the balance in favor of
those who have the privilege of not being in a hurry. Urgency is important....
The urgency that different individuals bring to the table impacts on their ability to
give and take in a collaborative process. Because it's our house that's on fire, I
don't want to spend two or three hours talking about an issue . . . . I want to put
out the fire! (Johnston, 1997, pp. 86-87)
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Cramer, a principal at one of the schools, reflects a similar sensibility as he notes that his
job security is dependent on results. While he suggests that he appreciates a collaborative
culture, he also notes that the principal ultimately owns the issues if the school is having
problems.
Conclusion
This quick review of the partnership literature reveals an interesting synergy
between the challenges facing partnerships and the challenges facing many charter
schools, particularly in the area of governance. While partnerships and the chartering
process seem to offer great promise for school reform, both have foundered on the
complex realities inherent in their implementation. Interestingly, although university
partnerships have been quite common in the charter school movement, no one has yet
examined in detail the particular challenges a charter school partnered with a university
creates. Clearly, the potential to bridge the gap between theory and practice is ripe within
these types of partnerships, as is the chance to bring the significant resources of a
university to bear on traditionally under-resourced communities. At the same time, the
challenges uncovered in previous studies—for example, the difficulties of collaboration
and the complex governance structure of charter schools—suggest that university/charter
school partnerships will inevitably encounter difficulties. Undoubtedly, creating these
partnerships without understanding the complexity involved is a recipe for disaster.
More broadly, the preceding review of the literature on school choice, charter
schools, and partnerships uncovers an important and as yet understudied element of the
charter school reform movement. The existing charter school literature has tended to
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gloss over the challenges on the ground facing charter schools as they are founded and
then developed. In particular, while the literature foreshadows the types of challenges
faced by low-income conversion charter schools, such as SDMS, no study has effectively
examined the central role that the governance structure plays in this scenario. Conflicts
over roles and relationships, battles for resources both from the district and outside
funders, and the cultural clashes that surface with the creation of much-needed but little
understood university partnerships all pivot around the role of the charter school board of
directors. Given significant authority, yet also undercut at every turn by authorizers and
other constituent groups, the charter school board of directors represents a central and as
yet little studied component of the charter school reform movement.
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CHAPTER 3
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
The dissertation is a case study of a southern California conversion charter school
board of directors. The study meets Stake's definition of an instrumental case study, or as
he writes, "the case is examined mainly to provide insight into an issue or to redraw
generalizations" (Stake, 2005, p. 445). As Yin (2003) notes, case studies are most
effectively utilized when "a 'how' or 'why' question is being asked about a contemporary
series of events, over which the investigator has little or no control" (p. 9), all conditions
clearly met in this study. A careful examination of the operations of a conversion charter
school board of directors offered important insight into the governance issues facing these
types of schools.
Grounded theory methodology helped to shape the study. As Charmaz (2005)
writes, "Grounded theory methods consist of simultaneous data collection and analysis,
with each informing and focusing the other throughout the research process" (p. 508).
There were three main parts to the research process:
•

Attendance at board of directors meetings from February 2008-June 2009.
These meetings provided the initial data used to generate the codes and
categories that would become the focus for later steps in the research process.
In addition, observation of these meetings allowed an understanding of the
public operation63s of the board of directors and introduced new codes and
categories as they arose over the course of the research period.
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•

Interviews with members of the board of directors as well as other key people
connected to the community. The interviews were started in January 2009 and
were completed in June 2009. An effort was made to interview all members of
the board of directors, with the exception of two board members who are part
of this researcher's dissertation committee. Other individuals who were
identified through their role at board of directors meetings or who were
identified in interviews as key people in the school's governance were also
contacted and, if possible, interviewed.

•

Document collection and analysis. Agendas and additional materials from all
board meetings were collected. In addition, key documents that were
referenced during meetings—the strategic plan, the proposed memorandum of
understanding with the district, the initial charter—were also collected.

Consistent with grounded theory, I approached the process without strong
preconceptions of what I would find yet also conscious of needing to conduct the study
systematically and thoughtfully. Thus, I took steps that forced me to revisit each type of
data—board meeting transcripts, interview transcripts, and documents—at several
different times during the process and in several different ways. As Dey (2007) notes, this
"constant comparative method" is essential to counter "the dangers of preconceptions"
and to safeguard against "our predisposition to see patterns and order where there is
none" (p. 175). In addition, the process was iterative; while the following section divides
each stage into distinct categories, it is important to recognize that each step informed the
other steps along the way. As an example, the code for "administrative structure" did not
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clearly emerge until spring 2009 when the board of directors began to publicly discuss
structural shifts at the school. The broader category, however, "executive leadership" and
other codes, including "role of the principal" and "relationship with board of directors"
had clearly emerged as early as June 2008.
I want to add a quick note on terminology. My definition for the terms code and
category are derived from Bryant and Charmaz (2007) who suggest, "It would seem that
the best working model places these terms in a hierarchy from bottom to top: respectively
code, category, concept" (p. 18). Thus, codes represent the most specific analytical lens
and are often descriptive. For example, the code "relationship between the school and the
district" quickly emerged at early meetings as issues were discussed involving the school
district. Along the way, a more general category—"board of director relationships"—
emerged which subsumed codes including the school district code.
Board of Directors Meetings
Initiated during the 2008-2009 school year, the study of the board of directors was
part of a broader research study being done by this researcher's university. Consistent
with grounded theory methodology, I did not enter the study with a clear hypothesis or
with specific preconceptions about the issues connected to a charter school board of
directors. The original decision to regularly attend the meetings was done in consultation
with one of the lead researchers with the strong sense that understanding the operations of
the board of directors would prove helpful for better understanding charter schools in
general. The study's timing was random and had no connection with specific issues or
topics that were or were not likely to arise at the board of directors meetings.

Monthly meetings are open to the public. During the 16-month period, I attended
14 board meetings (see Appendix A for complete list). At all meetings, I observed as a
member of the audience. While there are small windows of opportunity for participation
from the audience, I did not participate in any way during the meetings. I audio-taped all
meetings and I also typed detailed minutes as I listened and observed. Near the conclusion
of the 16-month period, I re-listened to each meeting and added detail to the minutes I
had initially transcribed. The systematic analysis of board meetings can be divided into
several stages—focus for early research, creation of interview guide, and reexamination
for findings.
Focus for Early Research
During the course of board of directors meetings in spring 2008,1 was able to
generate codes and categories that would provide a focus for additional research by
paying attention to the issues that arose at meetings. By listening at the meetings and
paying attention to the agenda items, I was able to quickly generate a preliminary list of
categories and codes. For example, the category of "financial management" became
readily apparent through board discussion, as well as the sub-codes of the role of a
"memorandum of understanding" with the school district and the issue of the "SELPA."
With the turmoil in June 2008 surrounding the executive director, the codes "relationship
between the board and the executive director" and "the role of the executive director"
emerged. In addition, the turmoil throughout the subsequent months revealed real
questions about "the role of the board of directors," both in terms of the perception of the
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board members themselves and members of the broader community, including parents
and teachers.
During summer 2008,1 immersed myself in the research literature of charter
schools, partnerships, and non-profit governance. The initial codes and categories
generated during the spring helped to focus the literature review. In particular, the
decision to examine partnership literature emerged from the issues surrounding the
partnership between the charter school and the university. In addition, I looked for
literature connected to charter school fiscal management, as well as research on the role
of the executive director or principal in a charter school.
Creation of Interview Guide
In January 2009, following attendance at nearly one year's worth of meetings and
after spending extensive time reviewing relevant literature, I created an interview guide.
The interview guide was structured around codes and categories that had emerged from
the board meetings and that had emerged from the literature. A more detailed explanation
of the guide will be provided in the section on interviews.
Reexamination for Findings
During the final data analysis stage of the dissertation, I re-listened to each audiotaped session of the board of directors meetings while simultaneously reviewing and
adding detail to the notes I had taken during meetings. Following this process, I then
carefully coded each meeting transcript using Microsoft Word track changes. First, I
coded for the codes identified in the early stages of the research—relationship with the
school district, for example.
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Finally, I revisited the transcript one more time with an eye toward topics or
issues that may have been silenced or that may not have been recognized explicitly by the
participants. While not always obvious, I looked for instances in which issues were raised
and then ignored, or in which comments were made suggesting a particular mindset that
may not have been evident to the participants themselves. In particular, I was conscious
of the potential presence of a "deficit model" of the community, given some of the
research that had emerged during the preceding year as well as comments made during
interviews.
Interviews
Interviews offered additional insights into the issues that were raised during the
board meetings as well as more detailed information about specific topics. The interviews
offered insight into the less public elements of the board of directors' job, although the
study did not involve the examination or analysis of confidential materials or issues.
Starting in January 2009,1 began interviewing members of the board of directors as well
as other individuals who had been identified as key players in the operations of the board
of directors. Between February 2008 and June 2009, 14 people served on the board of
directors, with 11 members on the board of directors at the conclusion of the study in
June 2009, although only 6 of those members were signed up to return for the 2010-2011
school year. In the end, I interviewed 15 people, including 9 members of the board of
directors, one school administrator, the school's liaison with ExEd (an educational
management organization that provides financial services for a number of charter schools
in southern California), two members of the San Diego Unified School District (SDUSD)
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Office of School Choice, and a representative from the California Charter School
Association (CCSA). I did not interview two members of the board of directors because
they were members of my dissertation committee. In addition, two of the three faculty
representatives to the board declined repeated interview requests. I interviewed the
founding executive director in February 2007 as part of an initial study that led to this
research, but she declined repeated requests to be interviewed in spring 2009 and thus I
was not able to conduct an interview with her during the 16-month period of this study. In
addition, the interim executive director, while not offering an outright rejection to my
numerous requests, never had adequate time to meet for an interview. I will return to this
issue in the limitations section.
Interviews ranged from 30 minutes to 90 minutes, although most lasted 60-75
minutes. All of the interviews, except for two, were taped and fully transcribed. One of
the exceptions was a phone interview with a board member, in which I did not have the
technology to tape the conversation. I did, however, attempt to transcribe on my computer
as closely as possible the conversation as we talked. The second interview was with the
representative from the CCSA. I did not tape this, as it was primarily an informational
interview about charter schools in general. While she had passing knowledge of the
school, she did not have adequate knowledge to justify inclusion alongside the other
interview transcripts.
An interview guide was utilized for all interviews. The guide was initially written
for the members of the board of directors, thus minor modifications were made when
speaking with individuals who were not directly involved with the operations of the
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school, such as the members of the SDUSD Office of School Choice. In those cases, the
key issues were still addressed but certain topics—such as the history of the
school—were not broached as the individuals did not have any knowledge or expertise
about that area. Appendix B provides a detailed analysis of the interview guide and the
rationale for why each question was used. In broad terms, the interview guide was created
from codes and categories that had emerged through attendance at the board meetings and
also through the literature. The interview guide was utilized to ensure that I asked about
key areas and to allow for consistency when I returned to analyze the interviews. I did not
religiously adhere to the interview guide, although it did provide a clear framework for
each conversation.
Interview transcripts were initially coded using the codes that had been generated
through the analysis of the board meetings and the literature. Following this step,
transcripts were reanalyzed with an eye toward finding codes that may not have been
evident at first glance. Similar to the process used for analyzing board meetings, I looked
for issues that may have been lingering under the surface.
Document Collection
These data were supplemented by the collection of official materials from the
meetings, including minutes, agendas, and other supplementary items. In addition,
historical materials were also gathered, such as the school's original charter, articles in
the local newspaper chronicling the school's early years, and the school's 2007 Strategic
Plan. I used these documents throughout the analysis and writing process, as they offered
evidence and clarification for issues that arose during board meetings and interviews. For
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example, a question arose about the terms of the original partnership agreement between
the university and the school. Reviewing the original charter documents, I was able to
find the initial partnership agreement, thus helping to clarify the formal conditions. I also
did some analysis of the documents. For example, I reviewed board agendas and
executive director reports with an eye toward better understanding the meeting structure
and the patterns that emerged over the 16-month period.
Data Analysis
As noted above, coding was systematically applied for each research area. In
addition, a level of triangulation occurred throughout the study, as the different research
areas continually informed the steps taken in other areas (Glesne, 2006). For example, the
board meetings provided the basic research which was then developed through the
interview and document collection process. At the same time, the timing of the interviews
allowed me to consider new insights at future board meetings and during the analysis
stage.
In the early stages of writing the dissertation, several categories continually
emerged in interviews and board meetings—fiduciary governance (accountability, fiscal
management, facilities management, etc), roles and relationships (of board, partnership,
faculty, school district), and communication (transparency of, confidentiality
surrounding). Examination—and reexamination—of these categories suggested the
presence of an underlying analytical framework. The framework focused on three
tensions that inhere in the charter school governance structure—governance v
management, transparency v confidentiality, and representation v trusteeship. Discovery
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of the framework helped to structure the findings chapter and helped to bring together
what had seemed at times to be disparate and discrete analysis. Following recognition of
this framework, I was able to revisit the data once again with an eye toward locating the
different codes and categories within this framework. New insights also emerged. My
ultimate ability to cohere much of the data within the framework helped to reaffirm its
analytical power.
Significance
The proposed study provides an important lens by which to examine the charter
school reform effort, namely the role of a charter school board of directors. The central
promise of charter school reform has been the ability for a school to have increased
autonomy while being adequately held accountable as a publicly funded school. To date,
few studies have carefully examined how this promise plays out in practice. In addition,
NCLB-mandated conversion charter schools represent an understudied subset within the
charter school world, as they represent a novel approach to addressing traditionally
underperforming schools.
While it would be difficult to argue that the findings from this study are
generalizeable to all charter schools, they can provide a framework by which to examine
other charter schools and the viability of the charter school reform effort (Donmoyer,
1990). The challenges of charter school governance—lack of financing, inadequate
facilities, conflicts with key external groups including school districts—would assumably
be exacerbated in a NCLB-mandated conversion charter school, thus making the role of
the board of directors even more significant.
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Limitations
Recognition of my own subjectivity, as well as that of some of the research
participants, is important as I venture into this study (Peshkin, 1988). SDMS is intimately
connected with the university where I am a graduate student, thus there is a natural
inclination on my part to treat the school and its development favorably. In addition, I am
closely connected to many members of SDMS's board of directors, as they are the leaders
of the research team of which I am a part and they are also connected to the university.
Indeed, one of the interview subjects is the dean of my graduate school program. Beyond
the personal connections, I am also aware of my own predisposition as a private school
educator to view charter schools favorably. I recognize my belief that charter schools
represent a positive development amidst the often dispiriting world of urban educational
reform, in particular as they benefit from at least some of the advantages I experience in
my own educational climate. In addition, I know that my commitment to educational
equity, my desire to see private schools become increasingly inclusive, and the admission
of a few SDMS graduates into the school where I work predisposes me to the image of
SDMS as a success story.
Despite all this, I feel confident that my particular research focus and the proposed
research design ensure as much as possible that the analysis will effectively reflect the
data that are collected. As with all researchers, I enter this study with my own subjectivity
(Peshkin, 1988). With careful attention to these biases, as well as a research design that
ensures triangulation of data (interviews, documents, and observations) I am confident
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that I will be able to provide an analysis that will shed helpful light on this important
topic.
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CHAPTER 4
FINDINGS
The past 16 months at SDMS have been quite tumultuous for the board of
directors. While the opening meeting in February 2008 offered little indication of the
major issues that would arise, hints of impending trouble surfaced as early as March 2008
and by the fall the board and the school were in turmoil. As noted earlier, the time period
for this study was randomly selected, yet the ensuing difficulties and their tentative
resolutions provided a rich period for analysis. A number of significant events and
decisions were made during this time, and the role of board governance, which sometimes
remains invisible within communities, was at moments during this period vividly brought
to the forefront. In the end, this period provided a fascinating window into the role of
board governance in the operation of a conversion charter school.
One means of understanding the period is through the analysis of three underlying
tensions that inhere in the charter school board structure—management versus
governance, transparency versus confidentiality, and representation versus trusteeship.
Management versus governance refers to the classic dance between a board of directors
and an executive director for what is the appropriate role for each group in ensuring the
organization's long-term success. Carver (2006) envisions a board and an executive
director on opposite sides of a clearly delineated line, with the board responsible for
policymaking (i.e., governance) and the executive director for implementation (i.e.,
management). On the other hand, Chait et al. (2005) describe a slightly more nuanced
model, with three modes of operation for a board—fiduciary, strategic, and generative.
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Within this framework, the board and the executive director work much more
collaboratively to address significant issues of governance. Again, there is an underlying
expectation that the board is not heavily involved in management, although the lines
between what is governance and what is management are at least somewhat more fluid.
Ultimately, an effective board must openly wrestle with this question and have a clear
sense of the decisions it is making vis a vis governance or management.
The second tension boards face is between transparency and confidentiality. The
responsibilities of a board of directors sometimes require discretion—the discussion of
personnel matters, for example. In addition, effective discussion of some
issues—expansion or removal of a program, for example—may require a focus on the
long-term and a consideration of issues that are initially difficult to effectively discuss in
an open forum. While open conversation is ultimately important, an inability to have
some level of private conversation may inhibit a board of directors' ability to function.
On the other hand, a successful board of directors must ensure adequate transparency to
reassure members of the community that the board is pursuing the best interests of the
broader community. Too many decisions made in private without any public
understanding or input will lead to a lack of trust and a perception that the board of
directors is not doing what is best for the organization. While traditional non-profits
conduct most of their board work in private, public schools are required to conduct their
business in public. The hybrid model of a California charter school—neither truly a nonprofit nor truly a public school—operates within a tension between the legal obligations
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to conduct business in public as mandated by the Brown Act and the benefits of being
able to conduct some conversations in private.
Trusteeship versus representation refers to the tension over what are the expected
roles for charter school board members. Trusteeship refers to the traditional role expected
for board members in a non-profit organization. As trustees, board members are charged
with holding the organization in trust and ensuring its long-term success and
sustainability. Board members, acting within the trusteeship framework, are expected to
adopt a long-term perspective and not become embroiled in day-to-day issues or shortterm concerns that can distract from the organization's long-term needs. Representation,
on the other hand, reflects the traditional public school board model. Elected to their
positions, public school board members represent distinct interests and their decisions
often reflect current political tensions or issues. Again, the charter school model—which
is somewhere between a non-profit and a public school board model—lends itself to
confusion over the expectations for board members and raises questions about whether
board members should lean in one direction or the other.
Utilizing these three tensions as a framework, an analysis of the period suggests
four major findings:
•

During the early period (February 2008-June 2008), the board focused on
governance and tended toward the more traditional non-profit model of
trusteeship. While relatively successful, simmering tensions were evident
surrounding the role of the board in the day-to-day operations of the school.
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•

During the tumultuous period (July 2008-December 2008), a failed search for
a replacement and growing distrust of the partnership subsumed all other
conversations. Tension around confidentiality versus transparency
overwhelmed normal board operations.

•

During the troubled peace (January 2009-June 2009), the board veered heavily
toward transparency and, in some ways, abdicated its governance
responsibilities under community pressure. The representation versus
trusteeship tension came to the forefront as the board moved in a new
direction and seemed to be veering toward a public school board-style and
away from a non-profit model. During this period, the partnership between the
university and the school dissolved, signaling a shift in the school's future
direction.

•

A lack of strong executive leadership throughout the period and a lack of
strong board leadership during the second two periods (June 2008-July 2009)
created significant challenges for the school, particularly in terms of
determining the appropriate role of the board vis-a-vis the executive director
and appropriate levels of communication about difficult issues.

The chapter will be divided into three sections reflecting three periods that occurred
during the study. While these tensions are clearly not limited to these periods, each period
lends itself to a greater focus on one of the three analytical lenses.
During the first period (February 2008-June 2008), what I would term "Normal
Operations," the school seemed to be functioning relatively effectively. However, the
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emerging conflict surrounding the role of the university/school partnership illustrates the
governance versus management tension that is so often at the heart of board operations.
During the next period (Late June 2008-December 2008), what I would term
"Tumultuous Times," the school experienced a dramatic upheaval, precipitated by the
resignation of the executive director in late June. The subsequent search for a replacement
was badly mishandled by the board and by the end of the period faculty and even some
parents were up in arms, calling for the dissolution of the university partnership and
expressing serious concern with the board's decision not to hire the interim executive
director. The board's struggles come into focus when viewed through the confidentiality
versus transparency tension. During the final period (January 2009-June 2009), what I
would term "A Troubled Peace," the board stepped back significantly and allowed the
interim executive director to assume the role as the permanent replacement. The period
ended with the dissolution of the university partnership, the resignation of a significant
majority of the board at least partially related to that dissolution, and serious questions
about the school's long-term sustainability. At the same time, glimmers of hope existed,
with the beginning of a strategic planning process and a perception of growing
community engagement and involvement. Events of the period highlight the tension
between representation and trusteeship.
Period 1: Normal Operations
Events during the so-called period of "normal operations" provide an excellent
means of understanding the roles played by the board of directors, particularly when
contrasted with the later periods during which the normal functions of a board were
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heavily subsumed beneath crisis management. An examination of this period shows the
board heavily focused in areas of traditional non-profit governance—fiscal and facilities
management, holding the organization and the executive director accountable, and
negotiations with the outside groups such as the school district. The board's rare ventures
into more contested terrain—the role of university research at the school, for example—
highlights a classic management versus governance tension, as the board finds itself
trying to navigate its role vis-a-vis the appropriate role of the executive director and
faculty. The ensuing conflict also reveals deeper leadership concerns that would become
even more apparent later during the research period.
Management Versus Governance
As noted earlier, the tension between management and governance is a common
conflict between boards and executive directors. During this early period, board
operations seemed to be heavily focused in the areas of governance, and there were only
limited examples of situations in which the board moved into what could be perceived as
management roles. An analysis of these contested situations, such as determining the role
of university research at the school, reveals a classic management versus governance
tension. In order to better understand the distinctions in these roles, however, I want to
start by viewing examples of the board's broader work during this period. These
examples fit squarely in the fiduciary mode (a typical governance function) as described
by Chait et al. (2005). The fiduciary mode ensures that the school remains "faithful to
mission, accountable for performance, compliant with relevant laws and regulations"
(pp. 7-8). This mode emphasizes accountability and oversight, and includes financial and
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legal support and oversight, management of the executive director, monitoring of the
academic program, and management of relationships with key internal (faculty, parents)
and external (district office, partner university, funders) groups.
Given the operational nature of many of these issues (facilities oversight, for
example), organizations often find the lines between governance and management blurred
when in the fiduciary mode. Yet, during the early period, the majority of board activities
did not generate controversy. In large part, this reflected two related realities. First, the
bulk of the board's work was in areas that were clearly not strengths of the executive
director or other members of the school administration. The school administration had no
problem ceding these issues to more experienced individuals, particularly given the heavy
workload the administration was shouldering. Second, the work did not significantly
engage the board in the operations of the educational program, thus the board was not
potentially stepping on toes or questioning the expertise of the administration and faculty.
Forays into this contested terrain—in the guise of research, for example—generated a
more expected defensive reaction from the administration. A closer examination of the
board's work will shed further light on the issue.
Fiscal and Facilities Oversight
The best example of effective and non-contested fiduciary work can be seen in the
board's handling of fiscal and facilities oversight. SDMS contracted with a non-profit
educational management organization to conduct its financial management. The board's
finance committee worked with the EMO representative to track and monitor the board's
financial situation, and to ensure that the school remained financially solvent. The chair
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of the finance committee seemed to take his responsibility extremely seriously, and he
consistently stressed that the school's financial policies were exceedingly conservative
and that the school carefully tracked every penny it spent. The representative from the
EMO contrasted the financial management of SDMS's board with that of other charter
schools, noting:
SDMS was the last school to pay their fees, because we were making sure they
were right. We were the last people to sign off on the facility use agreement until
we all agreed it was fair. They are used to SDMS. SDMS set the tone of being
tough negotiators from the get go and we have earned a certain level of respect
that will help us in a lot of ways. (EMO representative, interview, January 2009)
The board regularly received financial updates at meetings, although they generated
almost no conversation. Despite that, every indication was that the school was fiscally
sound and that the finance committee was a real strength of the board.
One of the key factors that explain the school's successful fiscal management was
connections between board members and members of the SDUSD Central Office. Several
board members had long-standing political connections in the community, connections
they could call upon in their role as board members. The EMO representative noted, "A
lot of these guys already have relationships, they helped these people get elected. So it is
almost like I need you, I need you to be here, and it has paid off big for SDMS" (EMO
representative, interview, January 2009). Board connections with the district were
particularly important because one of the largest issues that the school faced during the
year were their efforts to resolve ongoing disagreements about school district charges for
special education services. At the heart of the conflict was the lack of a memorandum of
understanding (MOU) between the school district and charter schools, something that was
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being negotiated during the 2007-2008 school year and that was finally approved by a
number of charter schools during the 2008-2009 school year. Without this MOU, the
school and the district found themselves constantly battling over two fees—special day
fees, which are fees charged by the district to provide services for students who are not
mainstreamed, and an encroachment fee, which are fees charged per student to cover
general special education services provided by the district.
SDMS did not deny that it owed the special day fee, but it demanded clearer
accounting for the amount it was being charged. This was the crux of the battle described
at the March board meeting when the chair of the finance committee noted that the school
had not and would not "blink" when dealing with the district. More importantly, the
school's ability to delay payment of this fee reflected its commitment to fiscal discipline.
Ultimately, the school seemingly won this battle, as it was able to delay final payment
until June 2008 and, in the end, the school district agreed to the school's contention that
the fee was $10,000 too high and the school district forgave this portion of the payment.
During conversations about this fee in March, one of the board members made it very
clear that he was not afraid to make this a political issue.
Send correspondence to the department head but cc everyone on that board,
including the new superintendent, because we have to hold them accountable.
This is an election year, by the way. Never forget that. My old activism senses are
kicking back in. (transcript of board meeting, March 3, 2008)
As for the encroachment fees, the charter school was part of the school district's
SELPA (special education legal plan area), since it was not in a position to provide its
own special education services. As a member of the SELPA, a charter school essentially
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contracts with the district to have it provide special education services. This was not
unique to SDMS, but reflected the reality of most charter schools that are not in a position
to provide these types of expensive services. As part of the SELPA, it had no choice but
to pay the encroachment fee, but SDMS was increasingly alarmed by the yearly increases
in the fee. According to the notes in the February 2008 executive director's report, the
encroachment fee had increased from $365 per student in 2003-2004 to $657 per student
in 2007-2008. More importantly, the projected fee for 2008-2009 was $722. This fee, a
per student charge, effectively cost the school nearly $350,000 per year.
The school spent the first part of the 2008-2009 school year, along with a group of
other San Diego charter schools, seeking out an alternative SELPA. Ultimately, the
SDMS board of directors voted in February 2009 to remain in the school district SELPA
because it would be less expensive, but the board's willingness to do the research
suggested it was serious about maintaining fiscal discipline and that it was not afraid to
go outside of the normal avenues to seek a solution.
Another key issue for the school and the board was the maintenance and
preservation of its facilities. Similar to the SELPA negotiations, this issue was firmly
located in the realm of governance, not management, and did not generate conflict
between the administration and the board. Like the SELPA negotiations, however,
exploration of how the board handled this issue helps to differentiate this from the
management-related issues that generated more controversy.
A 2006 study commissioned by the Low Income Investment Fund highlighted the
complexity of this process for California charter schools (Smith & Wells, 2006). The
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study suggested the importance of having people with significant real estate expertise,
something which was not true of this particular board. Despite that, the school seemed to
be relatively effective in its ability to navigate this potential morass. Each year the school
had to contract with the district for use of the facilities, a process which was never pro
forma. Prior to the research period, for example, the district had tried to force SDMS to
share its facilities with an elementary school, a battle which SDMS won. Facilities usage
has been a hot-button issue in San Diego, and throughout California, in recent years, with
charter schools increasingly willing to sue the district in order to bring it into compliance
with Proposition 39, a voter-approved measure from 2000 requiring school districts to
treat charter school students and district students equally (Farland, 2005). According to a
policy brief from the California School Board Association in 2005, the legislation
requires that "school district-provided facilities are to be reasonably equivalent to those of
other public schools in the district and are to be contiguous" (Farland, 2005, p. 1). In
2006, the California Charter School Association brought a lawsuit against the district in
order to force it into compliance with Proposition 39, a lawsuit that was dismissed by a
trial court and then dropped by the CCSA. Each year, charter schools must submit a
Proposition 39 request to the district in order to receive facilities. In February 2008, the
SDMS executive director noted that the school had received a preliminary offer from the
school district for the 2008-2009 school year. Over the spring, the executive director
reported each month on the progress, noting in May that the school had signed a facilities
agreement with the district, although the agreement included a clause that allowed the
school to continue contesting the adequacy of the facilities. While there was never a
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formal effort to seek out new facilities during the 16-month period, the comment was
consistently made at board meetings that the school's facilities were inadequate. In
particular, people noted that the school was an elementary school site that was now being
used to house a middle school.
Relationship with District
A combative spirit was always close to the surface when board members and the
executive director discussed the school's relationship to the district. This was not unique
to SDMS; indeed, a report commissioned by the California Charter School Association in
November 2008 noted that the relationship between charter schools and the district had
soured noticeably during the tenure of Superintendent Carl Cohn which had ended in
December 2007 (Flanagan, 2008). The report highlighted many of the issues that
appeared at SDMS board meetings during the research period, including concerns over
SELPA fees, inadequate facilities, and the lack of an MOU.
Comments during board meetings, such as the one noted earlier, suggested that
SDMS was always ready for a fight, if necessary. There was a strong sense that under
Superintendent Cohn the school district was actively trying to sabotage charter schools.
SDMS board members saw evidence of this in the decision to create a series of K-8
schools in the SDMS area, for example, which was seen as a clear threat to SDMS
enrollment. Yet, interviews with board members and with representatives from district
office suggest that a positive working relationship between the school district and SDMS
existed throughout most of this period. Moreover, the arrival of a new superintendent in
February 2008 and the subsequent report by the CCSA suggest that charter school
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representatives in general sensed a change in tone with the departure of Superintendent
Cohn.
The finance committee chair perhaps best captured the school's general approach
to negotiations with the district and its general perception of the relationship.
We were very measured in dealing in all the subjects that you just mentioned
(SELPA, facilities, MOU). The school district had a lot of respect for us because
they knew we took our fiduciary responsibility very seriously and we didn't just
always sign whatever they sent. I would send some things back ... or negotiate,
they would send a bill and I would split out the payment.... And I think we do
that enough for somebody they really are going to gain respect. They are going to
stop trying to screw you all the time and that's what happens, and that's why those
issues—they didn't get us in trouble. They didn't raise to the level of causing any
kind of abuses . . . . We had a very good fiscal culture where we took the business
side of the school very, very serious. (Finance Committee Chair, interview,
April 9, 2009)
Thus, the school was always prepared to fight, if necessary, to ensure that SDMS was
treated fairly by the district. This spirit, coupled with political connections, seemed to
ensure the school relatively smooth sailing during this period. In each of these situations,
the board played a clear governance role, relying on its expertise and political connections
to support the school's efforts in difficult negotiations. Moreover, these areas were clearly
outside the realm of expertise of the administration, thus leading to no conflict between
the administration and the board. On the contrary, the board's activities during these
issues were clearly welcomed and reflected the board's most obvious successes during
this period.
Accountability
A more complex analysis is involved with the board's role vis-a-vis
accountability. While accountability falls squarely into the fiduciary mode, the challenge

of finding effective ways to hold a school accountable is always difficult (Hill & Lake,
2008). Unlike fiscal management, for example, accountability requires an executive
director to pull back the curtain on the educational operations of the school. The ensuing
conversation offers a complex dance in the best of situations, as the board needs to
understand what is happening and what the executive director and administration are
doing without trying to micromanage the situation. At SDMS this situation proved
particularly challenging for some of the board members, who brought a great deal of
educational expertise. This educational expertise could undoubtedly inform the
conversation, yet it was not clear to what level the board was expected—or should—
engage in these conversations. In the end, the executive director carefully crafted
conversations that focused on the least academic areas of school accountability—
discipline and attendance—and created an appearance of accountability without every
really engaging the board in meaningful conversations that might lead to improvements in
instructional practice.
At each meeting, board members were provided an executive director's report
which included statistics about average daily attendance (ADA) and discipline.
Explanations were often provided to explain significant increases or decreases. The
sharing of discipline statistics generated several conversations about how dramatically the
school culture had shifted since its conversion, a theme which reappeared consistently at
the board level and was clearly a source of pride for the administration and the board.
Month-to-month analysis of statistics revealed that SDMS was a safe school, with only
minimal discipline problems, a far cry from the out-of-control school that several board
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members and administrators described before the conversion. The most vivid descriptions
came from the founding executive director. Describing her first visit to the school in an
interview, the principal recounted:
I came back from vacation and we drove out here, my husband and I, early on a
Sunday morning in early August by 9 o'clock in the morning we were here. There
wasn't one stitch of green out here. Everything was dead. The weeds were six feet
tall. It looked like a prison. It looked hideous, and I thought, "What in the world is
going on?" (SDMS Principal, interview, November 8, 2007)
Later in the interview she noted, "It was totally a campus of chaos, kids just everywhere.
The adults were clearly not in charge." On the NewsHour, in nearly identical language,
she explained, "My first day here, I thought, 'Oh, my goodness, what am I in for?' At any
point in time, I would see 20 to 100 students just roaming the campus, many stories of
setting fires in the bathrooms, destroying property, a campus of chaos" (Merrow, 2007).
The founding board chair confirmed the transformation from chaos to control. She noted
that another member of the board of directors, a police officer for the city schools,
consistently reminded the other members about how much people's perceptions about
SDMS had changed. "He always reminds us how word is out in the community, you're
not going to find the police at SDMS, and if they are there it's because of something that
happened down the street, and they are trying to protect the school from it" (Founding
Board Chair, interview, November 16, 2007). One of the parent board members, who was
intimately connected to the community, consistently reminded people that the school was
located in the middle of eight gangs, highlighting how important it was for the school to
remain vigilant in creating a safe environment.
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Academic conversations were less common and, as the student achievement
storyline was less celebratory, the results of the conversations were a bit more complex.
Several times during the 16-month period the board explicitly discussed the performance
of low-performing students. The conversations typically revolved around the school's
efforts to create remedial programs, such as a Bridge to Success Saturday academy. The
academy was first described to the board with a bit of fanfare in March 2008, as the
executive director explained that the program was focused on 80 students, including 20
students who were really at risk as they had two or more Fs in content areas. The teacher
representative to the board added, "Quarter after seven last Saturday the students were
already lining up, ready to go, in uniform, and it was raining . . . . They really are
enthusiastic so far, and they are here because they are motivated" (transcript of board
meeting, March 3, 2008). The report in June 2008 was less positive, as the executive
director and the teacher representative to the board shared frustration with dwindling
attendance over the 8-week session, noting that in the end only 45 of the students
attended regularly. Despite that, the teacher noted, "The kids that came saw some real
growth. A couple of boys have made a dramatic turnaround, which was nice to see"
(transcript of board meeting, June 2, 2008). One of the board members raised the question
at the June meeting of the role of parents in this equation. He asked, "Where are the
parents with these kids? Are they part of the problem?" (transcript of board meeting,
June 2, 2008). A brief discussion ensued of the possibility of charging a nominal fee for
the Saturday academy and of including a parent portion to the day, thus encouraging
parents to stay and be more engaged in their children's education.
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A year later, the conversation suggested that the school had not made significant
strides in addressing this area, nor had the board done much to hold the school
accountable. In the intervening months, the school had for the first time seen its adequate
yearly progress score (AYP) fall, something which had been reported with much distress
at the October 2008 board meeting. According to the California Department of Education
(n.d.), the AYP is "A statewide accountability system mandated by the No Child Left
Behind Act of 2001 which requires each state to ensure that all schools and districts make
Adequate Yearly Progress" (California Department of Education, n.d., n.p.). At the April
2009 meeting the Standardized Testing and Reporting (STAR) results, which are the
means by which the AYP is measured, and efforts to support low-performing students
were combined into a conversation about how the school was preparing for May's testing,
as well as how the school was attempting to use testing results to support all of its
students. The recent completion of mock testing to prepare for the STAR tests was
mentioned, although results were not yet available. The chair of the board noted that it
would be helpful at an upcoming meeting for the staff to share the results of the mock
testing and to provide specific actions that were being implemented in order to support
low-performing students. While suggested, this follow-up did not occur during the
ensuing few months. It was also noted that the education committee of the board had not
met in awhile. The committee had been chaired by one of the former university members
on the board, but since her departure from the board it apparently had not been meeting
consistently. The executive director's interest in thecommittee had been limited from the
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beginning; indeed, it had taken over 3 years to convince the executive director to create
the committee.
Overall, conversations about academic matters tended to highlight the expertise of
the board members—clearly there were board members who knew a great deal about
these topics—yet in the end the conversations ended up going nowhere. Indeed, one of
the board members, the CEO of an educational testing company who had provided the
school educational software to track student work, attempted to help the administration
frame the achievement problem in 2008 and utilize his and others' expertise. He
suggested that the results from the 2008 STAR tests offered an excellent opportunity for
the school to make some course corrections, and also noted it was "far from a calamity."
He reiterated the role that the testing software could play, and stressed the importance of
adopting a growth model for analyzing testing results instead of simply looking at
averages. In particular, he emphasized that the AYP results, while relevant to the state
and to the district, were of limited value to the school itself, for they looked at school
averages, not individual student results, from year to year. In other words, a very strong
7th grade class could be followed by a weak 7th grade class, which would result in lower
test scores in 7th grade. The results, however, may not reflect real gains or losses by
students. As he noted, "measuring averages, I'm not sure that is a good decision"
(transcript of board meeting, October 6, 2008). He encouraged the school to create
organizational memory about strategies that worked and to really utilize testing data to
drive instruction. All of these suggestions appeared to fall on deaf ears. Undoubtedly, the
lack of follow-through was undoubtedly due in part to the challenges the school faced
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during the 2008-2009 school year, yet it also underscores the difficulty boards have when
venturing into these contested terrains.
University Research
The most visible crack in the veneer during this "normal operations" early period
was a highly charged debate about the research being conducted by the university that
emerged during the April 2008 board meeting. On the surface, the concerns highlighted
distrust with the university's activities. From an analytical standpoint, however, the fears
seem to reflect the complex role that research could play in a school and the location of
these activities squarely in the contested terrain of educational operations.
Questions initially emerged during a discussion at the April board meeting about
the university's research. A board member, who had joined in February 2008 and then
subsequently resigned after only two meetings, had asked for the item to be placed on the
agenda. The board member started by explaining he had had "a very unsettling
discussion" with the education committee chair, who was also a lead researcher for the
university partner. He explained that the researcher had been unable to answer him when
he had asked if the university was trying to create an econometric model of what's being
done at the school. He continued, "I wondered what the university is doing with all of its
different resources and I thought—does everyone know what [the research] is all about?"
(transcript of board meeting, April 2008).
While the education committee chair was not present to answer his comment, a
contentious discussion ensued between the new board member and the board secretary,
who was also the dean at the university. The dean defended the research being conducted,

noted that the school was carefully gathering qualitative and quantitative data and that
they would only have 2 years of data as of the coming August. She stressed that it
required at least 3 years of data to define a trend, and further stressed that the university's
efforts were a small part of a much broader conversation. The new board member
countered by asking if the school would be able to "identify ' i f . . . then' statements at .05
level of probability?" The dean dismissed the comment noting, "to turn it into a
numerical analysis at .05 validity is not why I entered this profession" (transcript of board
meeting, April 2008).
The conversation moved into other topics, although the tension remained high,
and right before the meeting ended the new board member walked up to the board chair,
handed him a letter of resignation and walked out of the room. People seemed a bit
stunned, and then a collective relief seemed to sweep the room, as several board members
spoke up and noted this would make the board stronger moving forward. The dean
remarked that it suggested the need for a true vetting of new board members, while the
board chair commented, "sometimes the chemistry is not there."
The reality, however, would prove to be more complex. In the ensuing weeks, it
became clear that this new board member's concerns with the partnership were shared by
other individuals within the school, including faculty and the executive director.
Moreover, the conflict surfaced what would become an increasingly powerful perception
in the community, especially among faculty, that the university and, in particular, the
dean held undue influence on the board. As the school's financial consultant asked in an
interview, "Is the university the dean, and is the dean the university? When someone says

the dean was here does that mean the university made the decision? And if someone says
the university, does that mean the dean?" (Financial Consultant, interview, January 2009).
Following the meeting, a faculty member who had been in attendance at the board
meeting sent a letter to the executive director explaining her strong misgivings with the
partnership (Board Member, personal communication, May 2008). The letter then led to
several conversations in May and June between members of the university and faculty
members in an effort to better understand the conflict. These conversations were not
raised at the board level, however, and did not appear on the board agenda. In addition,
the story started circulating that the board member who had resigned had been prepared to
provide the school significant financial support, thus creating the perception that the
university partnership and a defense of the research had interfered with a potentially
lucrative fundraising opportunity (Staff, personal communication, February 2009). While
impossible to confirm its veracity, the story likely stemmed from a comment the new
board member had made toward the end of his final meeting when he said he had
contacted the dean about the possibility of working with her to get a grant opportunity
which he would couple with his own money to provide every student with a computer. At
the time, he made it clear he was not going to do this given the research model in place.
Viewed through the lens of management versus governance, the conflict exposes
the challenges that emerge when the board engages in work that can be perceived as
outside the realm of governance and moving into the management of academic affairs and
thus threatening to school administrators and staff. Unlike negotiations with the school
district or the maintenance of financial records, research about teaching and learning is at

the heart of the school's daily operations. Under the right circumstances—a high level of
trust between members of the board and the executive director, for example—that
involvement might be welcomed. Indeed, the level of educational expertise on the board
was impressive and the possibilities of leveraging that knowledge in service of the school
undoubtedly represented one of the early reasons for the partnership. With a strong
relationship between the board and the executive director and excellent lines of
communication, one could envision a situation in which the university's research work
would be welcomed. In the absence of those trusting relationships and also without
effective communication, however, it is not surprising that the university's work was met
with skepticism and distrust.
The conflict also raised questions about the lack of clarity around the partnership
agreement. Research has consistently shown that successful partnerships are the result of
well-articulated agreements and consistent re-negotiations of those agreements
throughout the life of the partnership (Sanders, 2006). A review of the SDMS/university
partnership reveals that the initial agreement was brief and that ongoing conversations
about the partnership were not a common occurrence at the board level. The one-page
partnership agreement, dated December 16, 2004, provides an overview of the support
that the university intended to provide to the school, including student teachers,
counseling interns, professional development, and university student tutors. There is
almost no detail provided in the document about the specific supports, although there is
reference to two future meetings as well as a reference to the intention of the university
counseling department to implement a center for student support at the school (Board of
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Trustees, 2004). The document interestingly makes no reference to the expectations for
the school vis-a-vis the partnership, focusing entirely on what the university will provide
for the school.
Perhaps more importantly, the role of the board in managing the partnership was
never clearly articulated in the document, something that became particularly important
and challenging when this conflict arose. The presence of three university members on
the board added to the challenge, for it became difficult for the board to play a role in
managing a relationship in which several board members were intricately intertwined. In
contrast, for example, the negotiations with the school district allowed the board to work
together in conversation with an outside group, while the conversations about the
partnership split the board itself and also created a complex relationship between the
school's leadership team and key members of the board. In the final section I will look
more carefully at how some of this confusion over board member roles arguably led to the
dissolution of the partnership, but I want to turn my attention now to the second period—
tumultuous times—and shift from an analysis of governance tensions to an exploration of
communication tensions and the complex balancing act between transparency and
confidentiality.
Period 2: Tumultuous Times
Confidentiality Versus Transparency
The board was consumed during the second period (June 2008—January 2009) by
the resignation of the executive director and the subsequent search for her replacement.
Analysis of the period brings to the forefront the tension between confidentiality and
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transparency. In the end, the period illuminates one of the challenges at the heart of board
operations, particularly in the quasi-public realm of a charter school board of directors.
The board's decision to grant the executive director a 6-week contract and the
executive director's subsequent resignation was a surprise, at least to the general
community. An emergency meeting was called in late June 2008 to discuss concerns with
the executive director. The meeting came on the heels of what had appeared to be an
exceedingly positive year-end meeting in early June. Moreover, a local paper, the Voice of
San Diego, ran an article in June touting the school as a model for charter schools in other
low-income areas. The late June meeting started with a brief public comment period, that
included testimonials from a former teacher, who had also been the teacher-representative
to the board; a vice principal, who would later become the interim executive director; and
an executive director from a neighboring charter school. The public comments suggested
that people had different perceptions of what was really at issue. The former teacher and
board member gave the executive director a vote of confidence and assured the board that
he had not left because of the executive director, while the comments of the vice principal
suggested that the developing antagonism between the school and the university seemed
to be at issue. The school was out of session and there was a harried quality to the
proceedings. Following the public comment period, the board went into executive session
to discuss the executive director's employment, something it was allowed to do under the
Brown Act.
Later interviews revealed little about what had precipitated the executive session.
The public comment from the board at the end of the meeting simply indicated that the
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executive director had received a 6-week contract and that the board would be conducting
an investigation of "issues that had been raised" in the coming weeks and then the board
would determine the long-term fate of the executive director. The investigative process
was short-circuited, however, when the executive director submitted her resignation, and
thus a public explanation of the reasons for the executive session that had precipitated the
6-week contract was never provided. The executive director was quickly reintegrated into
the San Diego Unified School District and was assigned as a principal at a public middle
school.
Upon receipt of the executive director's resignation, the board appointed the vice
principal as interim executive director and then began a search process for a replacement.
Concerns about the search process emerged at the October meeting when the faculty
representative to the board was given a spot on the agenda. She noted that faculty were
anxious about the executive director search process and were eager for an update from the
board. She noted, "It could be as simple as an update letter, the steps that we have taken,
the steps we anticipate to take. The lack of communication makes people feel a little
unsteady" (transcript of board meeting, October 6, 2008). The chair of the board offered a
quick recap of the process, noting that there had initially been 27 candidates that had been
paired down to 6 and then 4. He noted that one of those four had been hired by someone
else, and they were still trying to schedule time to interview two of the candidates. He
then noted that two finalists would be asked to present to the staff. He quickly added, "by
that time we still will not have selected someone," and suggested that the board would
"monitor responses and reactions of the staff to the various candidates" before making a
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final decision. A few questions followed, including whether or not candidates had been
notified that they would be making presentations. The board chair noted they had not.
The comments of the chair of the board underscored what was glaringly evident
even prior to his comments—a clear hiring process had not been established. Instead of
having something that had been clearly communicated to the community—the selection
of a search committee, the publication of a position description and selection process,
periodic updates about progress—the process seemed ad hoc. The chair of the board, who
guided the process, failed to recognize the importance of transparency, particularly to the
faculty and staff, as well as the need for a process that involved a broad range of
community members. While it is true that the board of directors is ultimately responsible
for hiring the executive director, the best processes, particularly within the relationshipbased world of non-profits, create opportunities for all constituent groups to offer
feedback. A process that allows candidates to meet with a broad range of groups ensures
that the candidates have a good feel for the position and the challenges that await them,
ensuring a stronger possibility of finding a good match both for candidates and the
school. Moreover, the decision to invite only two finalists in to meet with the staff,
including one internal candidate, was almost a surefire recipe for disaster since it was
quite clear that board members did not feel strongly about the internal candidate. When
the other candidate failed to impress anyone, the board found itself in the exceedingly
awkward position of announcing a failed search after the staff had overwhelmingly
offered its support for the internal candidate (the vice principal of SDMS).
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The response from the community was explosive. Teachers, in particular, were up
in arms over a perceived lack of teacher involvement in the process and the board,
particularly the chair of the board, was characterized by several teachers as dishonest.
Frustration which had been near the boiling point following the executive director's
resignation over the summer exploded reflecting the broadly held perception, including
from some board members, that the search had been "botched."
Ultimately, the departure of the executive director and the ensuing process
revealed two common, but serious, challenges facing a non-profit board of directors
(Houle, 1997). First, is the challenge of having board members who do not have
extensive experience working in non-profit organizations trying to oversee an executive
director selection process. The need for community involvement, for example, is an
essential component of the search process, particularly in schools, yet it is something
which might not be obvious to people who did not work in the non-profit sector.
Compounding the problem at SDMS at this particular moment in time was that the one
person who truly knew how to run an executive search in a school—the board secretary
and former board chair—was perceived by many in the community as having caused the
resignation of the executive director. Thus, she was not in a position to run the search and
she found herself trying to offer input into the process from a distance. While the chair of
the board may have been able to mitigate this by bringing in experts from outside—
consultants from a group like the California Charter School Association, for example—he
apparently believed he knew enough to run the process and he failed to recognize his own
lack of understanding. As one board member later noted, "It was a real fiasco the way it
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was handled and part of i t . . . he had never done it before and rather than listening to how
it is usually done in education, he handled it how he would handle it in business" (Board
Member, interview, January 2009).
The second, and arguably more significant, challenge involves the need to balance
the tension between protecting privileged information that cannot be shared with the
community and ensuring sufficiently transparent communication so that the community
believes that the board of directors is carrying out its duties responsibly and ethically
(DeKuyper, 2007). The executive director's resignation hit right at the heart of this
dilemma, for the board was not in a position to divulge conversations that had been held
while in executive session that led to the contract change and thus was not in a position to
counter rumors that were circulating about her departure. There was a perception in the
community, for example, that a strained personal relationship between the board secretary
and the executive director, which had been exacerbated by growing discontent among
school faculty about the university partnership, led to the executive director's "forced"
resignation. The truth of this claim was indirectly disputed by a number of board
members, although none was in a position to provide details into what had actually
transpired. As one board noted in an interview:
On a board of directors you have a sworn commitment to professional courtesy
and privacy. Sometimes the board has to make a decision and cannot defend itself
publicly on that decision because of the employee's privacy. So you can be hit
upside the head with rotten eggs and you have to take it. And that calls for
restraint.... I'm a person who spent many years in the Civil Rights Movement,
and one of my greatest pieces is due process. Knowing my background in civil
rights and people saying you've been bought and sold, those are fighting words,
but you take it and you deal with it. That's one of the hard parts of being on the
board. (Board Member, interview, April 6, 2009)
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While the board may have handled the resignation properly, however, the dearth of
communication surrounding the search was less explainable and ultimately led to the
conflation of both events in the minds of many in the community.
Communication and the Partnership
Closely related to the conflict over the search was growing public concern
surrounding the university partnership. Again, the conflict increasingly became about
communication and the board's failure to effectively walk the transparency versus
confidentiality tightrope. A document circulating at the December board meeting
provided a "History of [the partnership]" from the perspective of at least one staff
member who felt the partnership should be dissolved. The document outlined a series of
complaints with the partnership—the university dominates the board, holds secret off-site
meetings, and is unresponsive to SDMS staff concerns; the university has not met many
of its promises, including failure to support board development and provide student
tutors; the university-led professional development was seen as too research focused,
impractical, and time-consuming; and research studies place demands on teachers without
providing any useful results or data. The validity of some of these concerns was
questionable, particularly the notion of secret off-site meetings, but a review of the issues
clearly points to a serious communication breakdown.
Furthermore, speeches during the open comment section of board meetings
revealed a panoply of concerns among faculty and parents (transcripts of board meetings,
December 1, 2008, January 5, 2009). Among these were concerns that "the board and
actual school have become separate entities," that the "the board is now dominated by the
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university," that "teachers and parents need to be listened to and need to be heard," and
that communication was so poor that parents learned of the results of the executive
director search through a phone call. The response by the board chair to these concerns
offered important insight into the constraints, or at least perceived constraints, of the
board's operations. According to the board chair, the board was required to listen and not
respond during the open comment period as a condition of the Brown Act. He reiterated
this expectation at the beginning of several meetings, clearly attempting to explain why
the impassioned and occasionally tearful speeches of community members received no
response from the board.
A review of the Brown Act suggests that the board chair's interpretation of this
particular practice is questionable, yet the impact of the Brown Act on the board's
operations is significant (California Government Code, §§54950-54963, cited in Lockyer,
2003). Indeed, the Act's impact was far-reaching and led in large part to the inability of
the board to fully operate as an effective non-profit board and forced it to increasingly
take on the contested, highly political character of a traditional public school board.
Under the Brown Act, all board meetings had to be public, with the exception of closed
sessions dealing with personnel matters, pending litigation, labor negotiations, or real
property negotiations (California Government Code, §§54950-54963, cited in Lockyer,
2003). The preamble to the act offers the rationale for its creation:
In enacting this chapter, the Legislature finds and declares that the public
commissions, boards and councils and the other public agencies in this State exist
to aid in the conduct of the people's business. It is the intent of the law that their
actions be taken openly and that their deliberations be conducted openly. The
people of this State do not yield their sovereignty to the agencies which serve
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them. The people, in delegating authority, do not give their public servants the
right to decide what is good for the people to know and what is not good for them
to know. The people insist on remaining informed so that they may retain control
over the instruments they have created. (California Government Code §§94950,
cited in Lockyer, 2003).
As a result, the board was forced to conduct nearly its entire operations in public. In the
context of the crisis, it appears that the board was never able to confidentially discuss its
options and share thoughts about how it might better address the crisis. As a result, the
board simply seemed to abdicate its responsibility to have the conversations, choosing to
remain silent and follow the lead of the chair of the board.
The concerns about the partnership did not simply get voiced during the public
comment period. A petition calling for the dissolution of the partnership circulated among
the faculty (receiving signatures of more than 20 faculty members) and then appeared on
the board agenda in January. The board chair again invoked the Brown Act and remarked
that he was "happy that we received the letter signed by the faculty, now we can take
action. That's why we couldn't respond before because it came in a public
communication, you can't take action or do anything unless it appears on the agenda"
(transcript of board meeting, January 5, 2009). The chair of the board called for the
creation of a fact-finding group to review the "charges" against the university partnership
and to determine if the petition had merit. He noted that the fact-finding group should
then suggest what, if anything, needed to be done to resolve the crisis.
The actions of the board chair were confusing on several levels. First, there is no
language in the Brown Act that limited the board's ability to have addressed these
concerns earlier (Lockyer, 2003). While the Brown Act does require items to be on the
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board's agenda, there is no reason why the chair of the board could not have placed this
item on the agenda without receiving an official petition from the faculty. Indeed,
concerns with the partnership had been brewing for months and had been voiced at earlier
meetings. Second, his decision to create a fact-finding committee suggested that the board
had no understanding of the partnership or whether or not the faculty's charges of
inappropriate activity by the university were valid. Indeed, one of the board members
from the university remarked toward the end of the conversation on the situation:
I think the sadness in this situation, not just about communication, no one feels
valued. I can tell you my faculty does not feel valued either . . . . I've listened and
I've listened, and I've internalized a lot of this, they've given a lot down here,
there are very highly trained people. The crime of this situation would be if we
can't pull it together. This is not about adult agendas, this is about these kids and
their futures, (transcript of board meeting, January 5, 2009)
The lack of public support of the partnership ultimately signaled the beginning of the end
of the partnership, but also strained the meaning of transparency versus confidentiality.
The board chair noted, "I want to give you guys [the faculty] whatever you want, so we're
going to find a way to give everyone what they want" (transcript of board meeting,
January 5, 2009).
The deeper issue here, as noted earlier, is the real constraints and perceived
constraints that the Brown Act placed on the board's ability to handle a very complex
crisis. Non-profit boards have traditionally tried to minimize the overtly political quality
of their proceedings, with trustees holding closed meetings that allow confidential
conversations that emphasize long-term interests and needs, not short-term, politically
expeditious results (DeKuyper, 2007; Innes & Booher, 2004). Certainly there is a danger
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that boards veer too much toward confidentiality, and Sunshine Laws, such as the Brown
Act, are certainly efforts to avoid mismanagement and malfeasance on the part of a board.
Yet the other danger is equally damaging, that boards may veer so much toward
transparency that they cease to be in a position to handle difficult challenges. The SDMS
board, in some ways, struggled on both accounts, mismanaging its communications about
important topics like the executive director search, thus creating the appearance of being
secretive. At the same time, in its efforts to meet the constraints of the Brown Act and
trying to be transparent, it was unable to have confidential conversations that might have
allowed the board and the school to move forward. Part of the problem may have been
that the board lacked sufficient expertise about how to best manage the Brown Act during
this 16-month period. Interviews with board members revealed that early in the charter's
history a lawyer did sit on the board who offered guidance on the Brown Act and its
implications, but during the majority of this period no lawyer was present.
Chait et al.'s (2005) concept of generative governance is helpful in this context.
According to them, boards need to develop the capacity to address generative challenges
or what Heifetz (1994) referred to as adaptive challenges. They point to generative
landmarks, including ambiguity, saliency, stakes, strife, irreversibility. The
school/university partnership signaled all of these aspects, including ambiguity (multiple
interpretations), saliency (high meaning to multiple stakeholders), stakes (discussion of
core values or meaning), strife (high possibility of confusion and conflict), and
irreversibility (mismanaging leads to both psychological and financial irreversibility).
When wrestling with these generative challenges, Chait et al. (2005) argue that the focus

should be on finding a way to "frame decisions and choices, not make them" (p. 120).
With this end in mind, they encourage boards to suspend normal board operations and
engage in out-of-the-box thinking, potentially involving the consideration of
counterfactuals and hypothetical, trust intuition, and promoting honest and "robust
dialogue." As they write, "boards need to preserve civility but curb the dysfunctional
politeness and 'groupthink' (Janis, 1982) that chill generative thinking" (Chait et al.,
2005, p. 125).
The possibilities of generative thinking are exciting and, as noted above, could
have been well-utilized in this situation. Sunshine Laws like the Brown Act, however,
impede this type of conversation (Innes & Booher, 2004). How can a board have freeranging, open conversation in a public venue in which any comment may be misconstrued
or misused? As one board member noted during an interview, for example, the school
could not actively engage in conversations about potential mergers, for example, as those
would immediately become part of a broader public dialogue which could sink the ideas
before they even had a chance to be vetted or understood. "[The Brown Act] does not
allow for the free generative kind of ideas . . . . We can't be generative" (Board Member,
interview, January 9, 2009).
A somewhat ironic, yet telling, exchange occurred during the January meeting
which highlights this challenge. One of the soon-to-be new faculty representatives to the
board, a person who had argued vociferously that the board had not operated openly
during the preceding months, started to explain his concerns with the partnership:
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We have a communication problem, that's very obvious but there's also some
structural issues with the partnership and how it manifests itself here. One
structural problem is the make-up of the board in terms of the university and its
membership on the board. The impact it has is being overrepresented on the
board, (transcript of board meeting, January 5, 2009)
At that moment, the chair of the board asked, "What was the issue with that?" The
teacher started to respond, "Teachers don't understand why the university . . . " and then
paused mid-sentence. "I don't feel it is appropriate to talk about that at this point." The
board chair then quipped, "You're beginning to sound like a board member." Clearly, the
teacher recognized the same issue that other board members recognized—it is very
difficult for a board to have open, honest conversations about these types of issues in a
public forum. The board's options were severely constrained by this structure and, in the
end, led at least in part to the board's shift from a more traditional non-profit model to a
public school board model. I will address this shift in the next section as we turn our
attention to the final period—a troubled peace—and issues of the appropriate roles of
board members.
Period 3: A Troubled Peace
During the final period of my study, there was a visible shift in the operations of
the board. Analytically, this shift can be best understood by looking at the role of board
members as they shifted from a traditional non-profit focus on trusteeship to a more
public school board model of representation. As trustees, board members are expected to
"function as guardians and policy makers who are responsible for the organization's
mission and resources" (Widmer, 1993, p. 341). Board members are expected to adopt a
long-term perspective and not become embroiled in day-to-day issues. Representation, on
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the other hand, reflects the traditional public school board model. Elected to their
positions, public school board members represent distinct interests and their decisions
often reflect current political tensions or issues. Within SDMS, representatives focused
primarily on understanding and representing the viewpoint of a specific constituent
group—faculty or parents, for example—as opposed to the long-term interests of the
school. The impact of this change was unclear at the end of this period, although the
resignation of a number of board members signaled that it would be a very different board
that would start the 2009-2010 school year. In this section, I will review the original
process utilized to create the board and then explore how the tensions during both the
second and third period of this study led to a shift in the board's membership and
operation. In addition, I will explore how limited understanding of non-profits, at both the
executive director and board level, accelerated the changes in structure and operation and
raised serious questions about the school's long-term viability.
Board Composition
Research suggests that charter schools have consistently struggled to create and
sustain effective boards of directors (Hill & Lake, 2008; National Resource Center,
November 2008). The initial creation of the board at SDMS would seem to belie this
struggle. The initially constituted and maintained board of directors had a great deal of
financial, legal, and educational expertise. A review of the process to enroll board
members since the school's inception shows that the board composition had been
accomplished purposefully and thoughtfully. This group of directors focused primarily on
the role of trustee, as opposed to representative. Widmer (1993) offers a helpful definition
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of these terms, as he catalogs the myriad roles that directors play. In describing the trustee
role, Widmer references Houle's (1989, 1997) guidelines for appropriate board
functioning when describing this role. On the other hand, Widmer explains,
representatives "speak for or carry information to and from individuals, groups or
organizations" (p. 342).
In essence, the original constitution of the SDMS board seemed to be premised on
the importance of bringing together a representative group of people yet not relying on
those people to simply serve as representatives. While there was an expectation that these
people would share the board's work with their constituencies—at least in the case of
university partner members, parent members, and faculty members to the board—board
members described their role as that of trustees, focusing on the long-term sustainability
of the organization not merely the short-term needs of their constituents.
From its inception, the school's bylaws provided explicit guidelines for board
composition. According to the bylaws, the board would have no less than 3 and no more
than 15 members. In the original charter approved by the district, the school noted that
board members will "represent the community-at-large, the business community, and
educators" (Board of Trustees, 2004, p. 18). The charter also included an appendix
(appendix "B") listing the "initial seating" of the board, which included one parent, one
educator, one administrator, one community member, and two business persons
(community and regional).
The founding board chair, who was also connected to the university and who later
became the board secretary, explained that the original formula had been driven not only
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by a desire to get a variety of voices on the board, but also in response to the demands of
a grant funder (a major foundation in the community). In addition, the school was
following right on the heels of another conversion charter school that had partnered with
another major university. This conversion charter school was led by an executive director
who had been the principal at SDMS right before the conversion and had been a mentor
to SDMS's executive director. Thus, when the other school asked for three
representatives from their university partner, SDMS followed suit (Founding Bard Chair,
interview, January 2009). From the beginning, the founding board chair noted, the school
had kept a chart tracking the members and had sought to ensure that there were
representatives from each category that actually exceeded the minimum standards
articulated in the appendix to the charter. Copies of these charts from the first few years
show that the original goal was to have three parent members, two community members,
three business members, three university members, and two ex officio members, the
executive director and one teacher representative. During these early years, this shifted to
two parent members and four business members, although the dean of the university
noted she persistently pushed to have an additional parent member. Interestingly, a review
of these documents reveals that there was a consistent core of members who had been
part of the charter school since the beginning, while several positions seemed to
persistently become vacant, including the additional business member position and the
community member position. A third parent representative seat was absent throughout
most of the first few years, something which the founding board chair argued was due to
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the perception of the executive director that there were no parents who were capable of
filling the role (Founding Board Chair, interview, November 2007).
In February 2008, when the research began, the board was made up of 12
members. Reviewing the composition chart that was maintained by the board secretary,
members were classified as follows: three partner university members, two parents, one
community member, one lawyer, four business members, and one teacher. One of the
parents was also a prominent businessman and community leader. The lawyer had just
joined the board at the February meeting, and one of the business members had also
recently joined. Of the 12 members, 8 had been part of the board since the school's
inception in 2005.
Conversations with this original group of trustees suggest that the school had
enlisted a number of experienced trustees, and they were able to easily articulate the
classic division between governance and management that is at the core of non-profit
governance literature and best practice. These members understood the importance of the
trustee role—providing oversight to ensure the organization's long-term sustainability
and ensuring the organization meets its fiscal and legal obligations—and also recognized,
at least in theory, the importance of not micro-managing the school's day-to-day
operations. As the finance committee chair explained:
Governance means hiring the executive director/principal. Governance means
developing policy and instituting and implementing the policy that's adopted.
Governance means to provide fiscal responsibility and keeping the institution
solvent, making wise decisions in terms of achievement, academic hiring,
academic philosophy, and those issues. (Finance Committee Chair, interview,
2009)
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Along the same lines, and using similar language, the board secretary noted,
A good board is going to focus on hiring the executive/director principal.... A
good board is going to ensure that all the basics are done. In other words, there is
a fiduciary responsibility, that there are the appropriate committees and subcommittees of the board, that the information about the board is transparent...
that they are involved with the strategic decisions, that they may be involved with
strategic planning, but strategic decisions not day to day operations in any way,
shape or form. (Board Secretary, interview, 2009)
The consistency of the responses is telling, and was also consistent with responses from
several other experienced board members.
Shifting Role Expectations
One of the most concrete outcomes of the conflict that arose in December 2008
and January 2009 was the addition of three new board members, two faculty members,
and one grandparent. These board members, unlike earlier members, were brought on in
overtly political times and their membership was viewed as clearly in the representative
mode, not trusteeship. Indeed, the addition of these board members was offered as a
means of addressing concerns that faculty and parents were not represented on the board
(transcript of board meeting, January 5, 2009). During an interview with the grandparent,
for example, it became clear she did not embrace a classic non-profit vision of
governance. She envisioned a board that solicited the perspectives of all members and
that, at least as she seems to be describing it, brings together the disparate elements of the
community and attempts to ensure that everyone is working in concert to improve the
school. While not entirely inconsistent with a more traditional non-profit board model,
her ideal board seems significantly more engaged in the day-to-day life of the school than
a traditional non-profit board.
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I think our role is to monitor the school and more to keep it this school and I think
we have to put the safety and the education of the children as our first priority and
I also think that we need to interact in harmony.... Kind of like the three-legged
stool, there are the students, there are the teachers and there is the board and we
need to all respect each other and we all need to be listened to here . . . . We need
to hear everything . . . this way we can all be working together, I feel like we're
working together as a family. (Parent member, interview, April 9, 2009)
One of the new teacher board members also described his role as representative, a notable
shift from the trustee role articulated by other board members.
As a teacher representative, [my role] will be to represent the teachers and
represent their voice as much as possible which can be difficult because there are
a lot of teachers and they may not always agree . . . . I think you've got to go with
where the majority of the staff is. So if there is an issue on something you got to
try to see where most of the staff are and go with that. (Teacher Representative to
the Board, interview, February 18, 2009)
This shift in board composition means a shift in perspective. It is important, for it
potentially opens the door to conversations about day-to-day issues and operations, and it
can move the board away from its governance role. Instead of adhering to a more classic
non-profit trustee role classically that focuses on the long-term view of an organization,
this representative oriented board may take on a greater management role.
A strong representative role also shifts the board in a more overtly political
direction. The addition of the faculty and parent representatives clearly reflected a need to
respond to the political turmoil that was embroiling the school. As Widmer (1993) notes,
certain roles can actually interfere with the traditional trustee role. This representative
role would seem to have great potential for creating a political board focused on the short
term, not a board that focuses primarily on the long-term sustainability and success of the
organization.
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The presence of faculty and parent representatives also speaks to a central tension
in charter school governance, namely the question of the appropriate role for these
constituent groups (Smith et al., 2007). Again, while having representative voices can be
beneficial to an organization, the vested interest of faculty and parent groups can also
interfere with the more impartial perspective that is often desired of board members.
Interestingly, while some states, such as Minnesota, have required schools to have
teachers on their charter school boards, other states have expressed concerns that teacher
membership could potentially represent "a conflict of interest in having teachers set
policy that affects the conditions of their own employment" (Smith et al., 2007, p. 22).
While there was some discussion about the importance of having teacher representatives
to the board recuse themselves from votes during certain issues, it was not clear that the
full implications of adding teachers as voting members had been vetted during spring
2009. Indeed, conversations at the April 2009 meeting about the need to update board
policies suggested that there had been little consideration of the full legal implications of
this change (transcript of board meeting, April 6, 2009).
Reframing Earlier Debates
The addition of overtly representative board members also sheds an interesting
light on the conflict with the university partnership. Public comments at the various
meetings, as well as the comments of the new teacher representative board members who
had been some of the most ardent opponents of the board's early activities, suggest that
the broader community had a representative model as their mental model. With this
framework as the context, the distrust and anger at the university board members makes
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more sense, for members of the community believed that university members when
making decisions must be representing the interest of the university. The accusations of
backroom deals become more understandable, as community members struggled to make
sense of why the board would make decisions which did not reflect what they saw as the
will of the community. The only option they seemed able to conceive in their mental
model was that in some way the decision was benefitting the university.
An exchange at the January 2009 meeting again sheds some light. Following the
decision to not hire the former vice principal as executive director, the board chair had
remarked about the need to move forward. "You're going to have to trust the board has
acted in the best interest overall for the organization. We're going to have to begin anew
and say this is what I'd like to see tomorrow." One of the new faculty members to the
board jumped in, commenting, "The decision [to not appoint the vice principal as
permanent ED] has impacted the school in a negative fashion . . . . When you said you
made the decision and it was best for our school overall, I am here every day and it was
not in the best interest of our school" (transcript of board meeting, January 5, 2009). This
same faculty member was leading the charge against the university partnership,
apparently convinced that the board and the university were in some ways
indistinguishable and that the board had acted in the interest of the university.
In the end, some of this confusion stemmed from two failures of the board. First,
the board failed to educate the community and themselves about their role as a board of
directors. Instead, the board responded to a crisis by overtly shifting the role of board
members from a trustee role to a representative role, allowing the prevailing mental
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model of the community to replace the trustee model which had been the original vision
of the founding board and which had its root in the literature about good non-profit
governance (DeKuyper, 2007; Houle, 1997). Second, the board failed to recognize the
potential conflicts of interest which existed with its university members and never overtly
addressed the need to proactively discuss these potential conflicts. For example, the board
did not seem to recognize the challenge created when you have board members who are
also conducting research and providing professional development for faculty members.
While people can certainly occupy these multiple roles, the situation needs to be managed
proactively and the communication of roles and expectations needs to be crystal clear. In
the absence of that communication and amidst the appearance of a crisis, members of the
community made the logical—although not necessarily accurate—assumption that
somehow the university was driving changes in order to benefit itself.
The other major factor at play was the lack of executive leadership throughout the
period. In spring 2008, the executive director failed to explicitly support the partnership
when it came under attack and allowed the community to question the value of the
partnership and the role of research at the school (Board Members, personal
communications, May 2008). Publicly, the executive director said nothing, while
privately the executive director appeared to support the efforts of faculty who were
questioning the value of the partnership (Board Members, personal communications, May
2008; Board Member, interview, January 2009). During the remainder of the period, there
was no true executive leadership. As one board member noted looking back at much of
the period, "the root cause [of the partnership problems] is we are missing a leader . . . .
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An executive leader would in fact take and say this is what we are doing and why we are
doing it. I don't think they would just say this is because the board wants it this way"
(Board Member, interview, February 18, 2009).
Is the Administrative Structure Sustainable?
The board had an opportunity to address this lack of executive leadership during
the spring and to consider how to create an administrative structure which would have
long-term viability. The dissolution of the partnership and the movement of the board
toward a representative board, however, prevented a serious consideration of the
administrative structure and led to a decision based on the short-term desire to generate
the least resistance. Again, this issue highlights the shift in board role, as the board
essentially abdicated its responsibility to hire a new executive director and instead
decided to support a proposed administrative restructuring presented by the interim
executive director and the vice principal who had been passed over initially for the role of
executive director. The concept of a restructuring was a good one; indeed, research
suggests creating a sustainable administrative structure is a common problem in charter
schools (Deal & Hentschke, 2005). Deal and Hentschke (2005) argue, for example, that
successful charter school leaders tend to resemble business entrepreneurs, not traditional
public school administrators. The experience at SDMS suggests that a public schoolmindset may actually be a hindrance to successful charter school leadership.
The notion that the executive director position required too much of one
individual had actually arisen prior to the tumultuous events of June, yet there did not
appear to be any concrete plans underway to address this challenge (transcript of board
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meeting, May 5, 2008). During interviews, a number of individuals noted that the job
required, as one board member put it, a "super human being" (Board Member, interview,
February 18, 2009). As he noted, the need to be both an instructional leader and a chief
executive officer required not only a broad skill set, but also someone who was willing
and able to work a phenomenal number of hours. Compounding this problem, public
school principal training focuses primarily on instructional leadership and does not
include the non-profit management training which is so essential for running a charter
school. The simplest solution would seem to be the creation of two positions—an
executive director and an instructional leader. The executive director would have primary
responsibility for working with the board of directors and overseeing the successful
operations of the school, including facilities management, work with the district,
fundraising, and development of and successful communication of a vision with both
internal and external communities. The instructional leader, on the other hand, would
report directly to the executive director and would be charged with working with teachers
to develop the academic program and focus on student achievement.
At a board meeting in January, the chair of the board suggested that one of the
problems with the search had been the effort of the board to hire someone to do a job that
had already been recognized as exceedingly difficult if not impossible, instead of
spending the time to create a new, more sustainable administrative structure and then
conduct a search for the appropriate person or people (transcript of board meeting,
January 5, 2009). His comment hinted at what would eventually happen during the spring,
which was the creation of an alternative model created by the new interim executive
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director and the original interim executive director who had unsuccessfully applied for
the position. While their proposal was ultimately adopted, however, it fell far short of
creating the sustainable structure needed for the school. The model called for the creation
of a new part-time position—administrative support—which would report to the principal
and would be responsible for oversight of the strategic plan, the charter revision process,
WASC accreditation, submission of Proposition 39 paperwork, and "other duties as
assigned." The description seems to suggest a high-level support staff person who can do
many of the administrative tasks associated with these somewhat ad hoc processes. The
principal would be the direct report of the board and would remain responsible for the
daily operation of the school, instructional leadership, parent/community involvement,
evaluations, budget, working with the board, and partnerships. In essence, the model
suggested no real substantive changes, but rather the simple addition of another support
person to relieve some of the pressure on the principal.
The board conversation surrounding the new structure was awkward at best, with
several board members noting that approval of the new structure was in essence approval
of hiring the vice principal, who had been passed over in the first selection process, to
become the principal and the current interim executive director to become the
administrative support person. Indeed, during the conversation it became clear that
members of the board who had originally opposed the vice principal as the new principal
were simply acceding to the perception that the school had undergone too much turmoil.
One of the new faculty representatives to the board noted, "I support the plan, the staff
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support the plan, and I do not think it would be a good idea to introduce a change again"
(transcript of board meeting, April 6, 2009).
More significantly, the conversation revealed significant gaps in the understanding
of non-profit governance by the interim executive director and vice principal, a gap which
members of the board pushed on as part of a spirited dialogue. The original plan
presented to the board had both the principal and the administrative support person
reporting to the board, an unprecedented, and arguably impossible, situation in a nonprofit governance model, as it meant that there was no single individual charged with
overseeing the operations of the school. Moreover, the plan gave no clear sense of who
would be responsible for key duties, such as human resources. During questioning, the
leadership team became visibly frustrated and several times suggested that the board was
seeking out details that would be ironed out as things began to unfold. The most
concerning moment occurred when the vice principal, who would soon become the
principal, noted that it was difficult to firmly establish parts of job descriptions, such as
who would have responsibility for facilities management, because at some level it would
restrict the school when hiring if a potential hire didn't have that specific skill set.
Incredulously, one of the board members asked, "Why would you hire this person?" and
then quickly added, "So you'd change the job description?" Another board member
jumped in to clarify that the board was not seeking absolute clarity nor suggesting that
any change in a job description required board approval but, he argued, "we're saying it
cannot be whimsical," pointing out that the school could find itself in legal hot water and
potentially face a lawsuit if its hiring policies were not consistent with the law. He went
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on to note that the changes being proposed would require a careful review of the school's
policies, as new position and position descriptions could require revisions in policy. One
of the faculty representatives eventually jumped in to echo his own surprise with the
leadership team's reticence in providing clarity. "I agree with the concerns of the board,
and I don't think it's a guessing game. I also don't think it is 10 hours of work. I think it's
very doable in a short amount of time" (transcript of board meeting, April 6, 2009).
Ultimately, the board approved the changes at the April meeting, with the
understanding that the school leadership would revisit the changes and attempt to provide
clarity for the issues the board raised. The debate underscored what had been revealed
during the search process, that the vice principal had relatively weak communication
skills, limited understanding of governance, and no strong sense of the possibilities
inherent in the charter school model.
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CHAPTER 5
CONCLUSIONS
Postscript to Final Meeting
The final meeting in June 2009 offered a somewhat surreal ending to the 18month research process. On one hand, there were clear glimmers of hope, as the board
and the community shared the results of a recently initiated strategic planning process.
The strategic planning process was a key component in the early stages of the school's
charter renewal process, and was guided by an outside consultant. The initial outcomes of
the strategic planning session suggested that the school had covered some important
ground during the 2-day process. The retreat had involved 25 people, including staff,
board members, representatives from the school's partner EMO, a local pastor, and a few
parents. The majority of participants were staff, including administrators and teachers.
The initial work from the 2-day retreat was visible on the walls of the meeting room, and
included a pictorial timeline of the school's early history, notes from group brainstorming
responses to various prompts, and even some mock newspaper covers from 2015, which
were intended to represent people's visions of the school's future. Comments made
during the board meeting captured the positive energy that had apparently pervaded the
event, as well as the sense of community involvement and engagement. For example, one
of the ExEd representatives noted, "It reminded me of when the school was originally
formed, where they were a lot of community meetings and parents involved. This
weekend there were parents here, teachers, staff, the leadership . . . . There was a lot of
positive energy in terms of the future for the school" (transcript of board meeting, June 2,
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2009). Another board member noted, "I didn't want to go home at the end of every day,"
while the chair of the board remarked on the skill of the consultant and her ability to keep
the process focused on the future. He remarked, "Instead of worrying about yesterday, she
masterfully got everyone to worry about tomorrow because that's what it's all about"
(transcript of board meeting, June 2, 2009).
Yet amidst this positive new spirit, the board appeared to remain woefully
unprepared to handle the challenges ahead. Only three board members had participated in
the full process (the two faculty representatives and the new parent representative), while
the board chair had attended a portion of the event. In addition, the incoming principal
failed to provide much reassurance as to his ability to handle his newfound
responsibilities. During the meeting, he stumbled through an initial attempt to describe
the process. The chair of the board then asked for a clarification on one of the items on
the plan: "Can you explain what you mean by building leadership capacity within the
community?" He initially said nothing, allowed two other people to make short
comments, then stumbled a little by saying, "From my understanding . . . from what I
recollect..." at which point another member of his administrative team answered the
question. Ultimately, it was left to the chair of the board and the outgoing interim
executive director to redirect the conversation and effectively communicate the positive
feelings that had been generated during the weekend retreat. As noted earlier, the
incoming principal was a career public school administrator who had clear strengths in
his ability to manage many of the processes essential to the smooth running of a school.
He was not, however, a visionary leader and he did not appear to possess the skill set that

114
would be needed to effectively guide and direct the strategic conversations at the board
level which would need to occur in the future.
The icing on the cake, so to speak, was the literal sharing of a cake thanking the
university for its 4-year partnership. The gesture, a gracious yet awkward attempt to bring
positive closure to a tumultuous relationship, obscured the absence of a more important
conversation that the board, yet again, did not address—the imminent departure of nearly
half of the board members and the pressing need to find replacements. Five of the 11
members were planning on leaving, as the three university members and two other board
members, including the chair of the finance committee, resigned as a result of the
dissolution of the partnership. Apparently, the board would have to wait until the 20092010 school year to wrestle with that important issue.
Research Questions Revisited
The 16-month study of the SDMS Board of Directors proved more eventful than
originally expected. The resignation of the executive director, the failed search for a
replacement, and the dissolution of the university partnership left the board operating in
crisis mode for a significant portion of the period. Amidst this often chaotic landscape,
board governance emerged from the shadows and took on a more public role than typical.
The result was a rich period for analysis that offered important insights into the role of a
conversion charter school board of directors.
In this final chapter, I will build upon the answers to the two research questions at
the heart of the study: What role did the non-profit board of directors play at the school?
How did a non-profit board of directors impact the reform efforts of an NCLB-conversion
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charter school? As noted in Chapter 4, the board succeeded in meeting some of its
fiduciary responsibilities—particularly fiscal and facilities management—but foundered
in its ability to provide the leadership needed to guide the organization through a
tumultuous year. The board's challenges were clearly connected to the absence of strong
leadership at the executive director level, as well as a board chair, during this period, with
limited understanding of school governance. In the end, the board as it was initially
constituted dissolved and left the organization in a tenuous place as it moved into the
final year of its initial 5-year charter. Arguably the majority of the board's greatest
contributions to the school—fiscal discipline, for example—were provided by board
members who resigned at the end of this period, suggesting a leadership vacuum at the
board level which would be difficult to fill. Most distressingly, neither the remaining
board members nor the new executive director seemed to recognize the extreme
challenges that lay ahead.
Contributions to the Literature
Charter school reform has, at some level, never been more popular (Landsberg,
Smith, & Blume, 2010), and yet a year at SDMS reveals the limits of that potential and
the clear pitfalls that can arise as charter schools struggle with questions of governance.
While much of the charter school research remains focused on understanding the
academic impact of charter schools, this study reveals that governance challenges can
impede the ability to ever get to that conversation. Concerns about executive leadership,
the role of the board of directors, and the challenges of partnerships serve as important
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reminders to policymakers that charter schools are not a simple silver-bullet solution to
the complex problem of traditionally under-performing and under-resourced schools.
This study built on the existing literature to illuminate several tensions that inhere
in the charter school board structure—governance versus management, confidentiality
versus transparency, trusteeship versus representation. The fact that this is a conversion
charter school, and not a start-up charter school, is worth noting, for it implies a context
that is even more challenging than other charter schools. The effort to renew a historically
failing school is a daunting task and the governance issues that arise in this context may
differ from those that arise for a board that is constituted in a start-up charter school.
Understanding the tensions discovered at this conversion charter school, however, should
prove helpful for all charter school advocates. A review of this study suggests the
necessity for charter school boards, executive directors and other school reformers to
consider three key areas:
•

Building the leadership capacity of both boards and executive directors in
charter schools through increased training and the creation of clearer
expectations for their roles as well as guidance about how boards and
executive directors can more effectively work together.

•

Analyzing Sunshine Laws, such as the Brown Act, with an eye toward helping
boards more effectively manage these complex requirements and, in the long
run, potentially advocating for changes to these laws to allow for higher
quality governance at charter schools.
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•

Recognizing the difficulty that often exists in partnerships, particularly
university partnerships, and taking proactive steps to create successful
partnerships that will capitalize on the vast potential that exists to help create
successful schools.

In the following section, I will discuss each of these areas and then move into a final
discussion of the limitations and delimitations of the study as well as areas for further
research.
Building Leadership Capacity
The National Association of Independent Schools (NAIS), an organization that
supports private, non-profit independent schools with governance structures akin to the
charter school model, has often touted statistics about the average tenure of a head of
school (the equivalent of an executive director in a charter school). According to NAIS
Executive Director Pat Bassett, the average tenure for a head of school was around
6 years in the early 1990s and then improved to nearly 9 years by 2006 (Bassett, 2006).
Bassett and others, using data from surveys in 1991, 2001, and 2006, attribute this rise to
the dramatic improvement in education for boards and heads of schools coupled with an
increasing synergy in the role expectations for both groups. A review of NAIS initiatives
from the last 15 years—the creation of a set of principles for good practice for
independent schools and the development of a fellowship for aspiring heads, for
example—highlights their efforts to better train heads of school and boards, both
separately and then together.
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Groups such as the California Charter School Association could play an
invaluable role in spearheading education for effective charter school governance.
Reviewing the struggles at SDMS, the effective utilization of an organization like the
CCSA seems that it would have been valuable, but the question remains, what would this
education emphasize?
Best Practices for Boards of Directors
Boards need consistent training in what is the most effective role they can play in
supporting the long-term sustainability of the school. The founding board chair at SDMS
did provide trustee best practice information, developing a trustee handbook, for example.
The handbook included key information for the school, including the school's original
charter document, board bylaws, and a document explaining the roles and responsibilities
for board members (Board of Trustees, 2004). A review of the roles and responsibilities
suggests an effort to get people to adopt the trustee role outlined throughout this study,
including an emphasis on recognizing the need for the board to "ensure the school's
financial viability," "hire, support and nurture the school's Executive Director," and
"understand that while the Board sets policy, it is the administration that manages the
school's day-to-day operations" (Board of Trustees, 2004).
During the 16-month period that I studied, however, there was no evidence of
ongoing board training or conversation about the role of the board at any meetings. As
one example, a conversation about the role of the board and the executive director vis-avis the university partnership may have generated important insight into the confusion
that surrounded the partnership and much-needed clarity as to how it should be better
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structured moving forward. As another example, the unconscious—yet significant—shift
from a board focused on trusteeship to a board emphasizing representation would have
been less likely to happen in a climate where regular conversations took place about
governance and appropriate roles for directors.
So what are the appropriate roles for a board of directors? The past year at SDMS
would seem to reinforce the prevailing wisdom of non-profit scholars such as Chait et al.
(2005) and Carver (2006) that boards should focus on fiduciary responsibilities, strategic
planning, and policymaking, and away from engaging in operational management. The
majority of charter schools that fail are the result of financial mismanagement or
malfeasance (Smith et al., 2007), emphasizing the importance of having a board that is
able to carry out effective financial and legal oversight. Interestingly, despite all of its
other troubles, SDMS appeared at the end of this period to be financially sound. The loss
of the finance chair and the failure to find a replacement, however, did not necessarily
bode well for the future.
The work that created the most conflict—research and the role of the
partnership—was the area that was most closely related to daily, operational management.
The board may have benefitted from more clearly demarcating the role of the board from
the work of the partnership, thus avoiding the appearance of role conflicts. As an
example, the board may have placed fewer university members on the board of directors
and instead placed them on a robust partnership committee that was reporting on a regular
basis to the board. As another alternative, the board could have more effectively utilized
its education committee to actively support and provide oversight of the partnership and
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the research that was occurring at the school. Either way, the board needed to actively
oversee the partnership, something that a number of individual board members
recognized but something that the collective group proved incapable of accomplishing.
The Role of the Executive Director
One of the challenges SDMS faced was the lack of an executive director who
understood governance and how to effectively work with a board of directors. Several
studies have noted a disconnect between traditional public school training for principals
and the demands of the charter school executive director position (Hill & Lake, 2008). A
traditional public school principal focuses heavily on student learning and faculty
professional development, relying on the district office and the superintendent to provide
many of the essential support services, such as financial oversight, as well as expecting
those offices to set a general direction for the district and, in turn, for the school. From a
structural standpoint, the principal reports to one person—the superintendent. A charter
school executive director or principal, on the other hand, is expected to oversee all
aspects of the school program, including financial and facilities management, fundraising,
faculty professional development, and, of course, all aspects of student learning.
Structurally, the charter school principal is the sole employee of the board of directors,
meaning, in essence, that the principal reports to a large group of volunteers. Working
with this group is a complex and highly political activity and something for which there is
no equivalent experience at the traditional principal position. Finally, the broad vision of
the school—something that is heavily influenced by the district office and superintendent
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in a traditional public school—rests primarily in the hands of the charter school executive
director.
Given the significant differences in these roles, the skill set for the two positions
is understandably quite distinct. As Deal and Hentshcke (2005) note, the charter school
executive director position offers several opportunities not found in the traditional
principalship—the "chance to play" created by increased autonomy, the "opportunity to
operationalize cherished, firmly held personal beliefs," and the celebration of the spirit of
entrepreneurship. As they write,
Regular public school leaders . . . emphasize priorities other than
entrepreneurial ones, such as faithfully discharging system responsibilities,
balancing competing political demands, upholding professional norms,
faithful stewardship of public resources, procedural compliance and
inclusiveness . . . . Like starting a business, starting a charter school seems to
require (and to attract) people who are ambitious, optimistic, financially
canny, driven by a compelling vision and attracted to a high-risk endeavor by
the possibility of success associated with high degrees of autonomy, (pp. 3435)
The only piece missing from their description is the ability of the executive director to
work collaboratively with a board of directors, something that was clearly a significant
factor in the struggles at SDMS. In the end, one of the lessons from SDMS is that the skill
set of a public school principal is not necessarily a natural fit with the charter school
principalship. Boards of directors need to recognize this when hiring and supporting the
executive director.
The Board Chair/Executive Director Relationship
The final piece of this puzzle is the need to focus on the board chair/executive
director relationship. Houle (1997) emphasizes the centrality of this relationship in a
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healthy non-profit organization. Houle notes the importance of a trusting relationship, in
which the executive director can utilize the board chair as a confidant and can rely on the
board chair to keep the board focused on its responsibilities and not become mired in
micromanaging day-to-day operations. In turn, the board chair can rely on the executive
director to share important information regularly and transparently so as to ensure that
surprises do not derail the organization. DeKuyper (2007) offers a similar perspective,
writing, "It is therefore crucial that the chair and the head make every effort to establish a
solid and supportive relationship of candor and trust, develop the capacity to be mutually
critical, and learn from each other's feedback" (p. 145). The relationship is a complex
one, for the board chair also is responsible for ensuring the board conducts a regular
evaluation of the executive director and, in the end, for guiding the board to dismiss an
executive director if the director is not effectively meeting his or her responsibilities.
At SDMS, the relationship seemed to founder throughout the 16-month period of
my study. During the early period, the executive director seemed reticent to share openly
and transparently with the board chair, and there did not seem to be a high level of trust.
The departure of the executive director, while not necessarily expected, does not seem
surprising when looking back at those early meetings and recognizing the executive
director's penchant for avoiding difficult conversations and apparent disconnect from the
board members. The executive director's focus on the day-to-day operations of the school
seemed to impede her ability to nurture and manage the important relationship with the
board chair and other members of the board.
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During the second two periods there was no real opportunity to assess the
relationship for a permanent executive director was not in place. The complexity
surrounding the hiring process, however, does not bode well for the relationship moving
forward. The board's initial public stance that the vice principal was not qualified seems
bound to create problems, particularly since the board's past does not suggest that it
recognizes the need to provide professional development or training to counter this initial
assessment.
Ultimately, effective governance is dependent on trust and transparency. The
challenges at SDMS underscore the central role that the executive director and board
chair play in ensuring the presence of these two essential qualities.
Sunshine Laws in Charter Schools
Innes and Booher (2004) offer a telling analysis of the impact of Sunshine Laws
on governance. Their description of the typical role of opening comment periods at public
meetings, for example, closely mimics what happened at SDMS. They describe a process
where each person is given a set period of time and the officials either listen passively or,
in some cases, do not even listen as they bide their time before the real meeting starts.
The process is extremely political as people desperately try to make their point and get the
attention of the officials.
During the past 18 months, there were only a handful of meetings where people
were present to give public comment. The other meetings, by comparison, were limited
almost entirely to members of the board of directors. At each meeting where a large
crowd appeared, the atmosphere was emotionally charged and the resulting comments
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were angry, tearful, and often combative. The comments, while clearly getting the
attention of the board, never led to thoughtful conversation and the process did not lead to
genuine collaboration between the community and the board. Following public comment,
nearly all of the community members actually left, meaning they did not even see what
was happening at the meeting. Indeed, the appearance of the public at only a few
meetings arguably reflected the lack of community engagement in the operations of the
board of directors, rather than showcasing the strong commitment of the community to
the school. While intended to increase community involvement, the Sunshine Laws
generated political tension and created a stormy year for the school, outcomes that
arguably could have been avoided with a truly thoughtful and inclusive community
conversation run by the board and the executive director.
A review of the Brown Act suggests that part of the problem for the board was a
lack of understanding of the act's actual structure. For example, there is no obvious
requirement in the act that the board not respond to the public comment period (Lockyer,
2003). Clearly, board education surrounding the Brown Act would be helpful for any
charter school attempting to abide by its strictures. Putting that aside, however, the act
really does create some tricky challenges for a board hoping to engage in effective
governance, particularly generative conversations that require an open, non-politically
charged atmosphere. As Innes & Booher (2004) write,
These "sunshine laws" are designed to assure transparency in government and
give citizens the chance to be informed and aware so they can comment
appropriately. It is not clear whether these laws have had the intended effect of
getting rid of backroom deal-making, but it is clear that they constrain officials
from engaging in timely and detailed deliberation around complex issues
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(Bohman, 1996; Boxer-Macomber, 2003) or in using self-organizing collaborative
dialogue, (pp. 423-424)
The structure of public comment periods created by Sunshine Laws like the Brown Act
frames the conversation from the start as one of combat, with the people needing to speak
in a sufficiently impassioned manner as to get the attention of the public officials.
Campbell and Marshall (2000) conducted a study of public hearings in Berkeley and
Oakland, California, and noted that "in all the meetings observed, there was a palpable
sense of individuals feeling they were engaged in a battle" (p. 330).
The solution for a charter school board of directors is by no means obvious.
Clearly, the board of directors cannot disregard the Brown Act. In order to engage in
generative thinking, however, the board needs to create an atmosphere in which people
can share openly and without fear of political recrimination ideas and solutions to
different challenges. A proactive and public adoption of community norms of dialogue,
for example, might serve as a helpful starting place in changing the tenor of the
comments.
Closely related, public policy experts would be well-served to grapple with the
idea that open meetings constrained by a rigid set of bureaucratic rules are the only or
even most effective means of creating transparent governance. Scholars of governance
should be charged with finding ways to balance the need for transparent and honest
governance with the need for boards of directors to create a space where complex
problems can be discussed and deliberated in a confidential manner. The solution is not
obvious, but a year at SDMS revealed the importance of having the conversation.
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University Partnerships
The failure of the university partnership represented a profound lost opportunity
for SDMS and for the university. Instead of capitalizing on the potential benefits to both
groups—the access to educational research and university resources for SDMS, on one
hand, and the ability to bridge the research/practice gap and offer an opportunity to allow
university students a place to practice their craft, on the other hand—the two institutions
became mired in a politically-charged debate that left both sides, in the end, high and dry.
Surprisingly, this type of outcome is not as unusual as one might expect. Indeed, the
literature on university partnerships is littered with similarly failed efforts (Cushing &
Kohl, 1997, cited in Sanders, 2006; Mawhinney, 1994, cited in Sanders, 2006; Epstein,
2004). Sanders's (2006) list of factors that contribute to a successful partnership—a highfunctioning school, a student-centered environment, effective partnership team, principal
leadership and external support—helps explain the problems at SDMS, as the school
arguably failed to meet effectively any of the items on the list. Indeed, as noted earlier,
there were at least three main problems—the lack of principal leadership, the failure to
create an effective partnership between the executive director and the board, the failure to
clearly articulate the partnership agreement, and the failure to effectively address the
perceived and potential conflicts of interest in having university representatives on the
board and conducting research at the school.
The experience offers yet another cautionary note to educational reformers. The
notion that partnerships with universities and other organizations offer a panacea for lowperforming schools simply does not hold true. While the potential of these partnerships is
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great, their actual implementation is difficult in an already challenging governance
environment. Groups like the California Charter Schools Association (CCSA) could
provide an invaluable service to charter schools by offering expertise about and materials
focused on supporting the creation of sustainable and successful partnerships. Model
partnership agreements, which underscore the potential pitfalls in these relationships,
would be a key component of these materials. Finally, boards of directors need to view
oversight of these partnerships as a key component to their fiduciary responsibility.
Creating sustainable structures to support the partnership—an advisory board, for
example, that would report regularly to the board, the school, and the university—would
be an important first step to ensuring their long-term viability.
Limitations of the Study
The SDMS case study offers a detailed view of one conversion charter school's
governance challenges during a 16-month period. The context of a conversion charter
school is clearly different from that of other start-up charter schools, as a conversion
charter represents an effort to renew a school that has a legacy of failure and operating
challenges. While it would be difficult to argue that the findings from this study are
generalizeable to all charter schools, they do provide a framework by which to examine
other charter schools and the viability of the charter school reform effort (Donmoyer,
1990). The resonance of this study's findings with the existing literature in topics such as
the role of the executive director, the contested terrain of board governance, and the
challenges of maintaining partnerships offers some validation of the study's value.
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The biggest constraint that emerged during the study was the challenge of
accessing all of the constituent groups. The tension between SDMS and the university
colored the perceptions of some people about this study and led to the unwillingness of
several SDMS people to be interviewed despite repeated requests. In particular, the
founding executive director and several key faculty members refused interview requests.
The lack of these interviews clearly diminished the findings and required me to rely on
other interviews and insights gained from attending board meetings. This is particularly
true in deconstructing the failure of the partnership, as I had to rely on the perspectives
voiced at board meetings and through a small number of documents, rather than being
able to really delve into those perceptions and better understand their root causes with
interviews. While I believe my findings reflect a reasonable assessment of what
happened, I have no doubt they would have been enriched by these further conversations.
Areas for Future Research
This qualitative case study not only suggests several areas for future research, but
highlights the importance of better understanding the impact of governance on the charter
school reform effort. The success of charter schools will be highly dependent on the
ability of reformers to create sustainable and effective governance structures, something
significantly more challenging than many reformers have historically recognized. The
promise of autonomy offered by charter schools is appealing to many people, yet the
difficult reality of creating and sustaining a charter school reminds people of the limits of
that promise.
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One rich area for further study would be a rigorous analysis of successful charter
school executive directors. The challenges of this position have been clear from this
study. It would be helpful to follow a series of successful leaders to see how they address
some of these challenges, including working with a board of directors, balancing day-today management with the need for strategic leadership, and effectively raising money to
ensure the school's fiscal viability.
On another track, it would be interesting to conduct a study of a broad group of
charter schools to gain a better sense of how the different issues identified in this study
play out at different organizations and to better understand which issues are most
significant in ensuring the long-term success or failure of different schools. Closely
related, it would be important to study the growing cadre of charter management
organizations, who have attempted to address some of the governance challenges found in
stand-alone charter schools by creating networks of schools that can utilize shared
services and benefit from sharing best practices. These organizations may have the ability
to address many of the governance problems that occurred at a school like SDMS, while
capitalizing on the promise of autonomy that is represented in the charter school reform
movement.
Concluding Remarks
In the end, it would be overly simplistic after cataloging the governance
challenges at SDMS to argue that the decision at SDMS to become a conversion charter
school made the situation worse for students in their once failing school. Clearly, the
campus was safer than it had been prior to the conversion process and at least initially, the
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test scores improved. At the same time, the short-term gains the school had—safer
campus, initial improvements in test scores—do not necessarily appear to be sustainable
given the governance challenges that occurred during this period. Indeed, the challenges
of charter school governance revealed in this study offer a sobering reminder that the
charter school reform effort is not a magical silver bullet.
At the same time, the issues impacting charter school governance revealed in this
study—role confusion for boards and executive directors, inadequate training for
executive directors, difficulty managing partnerships that bring much-needed resources to
traditionally under-resourced schools—do not seem insurmountable. Recognition of the
underlying tensions that inhere in the governance structure—management versus
governance, transparency versus confidentiality, and representation versus trusteeship
—would allow charter schools to approach these issues consciously and strategically.
While the challenges would not disappear, a highly functioning board and executive
director would seem poised to address these challenges in effective ways. Along a similar
note, the growth and professionalization of the charter school network through groups
such as the CCSA offers another means of addressing these areas. In the end, while this
study ultimately raises more questions than it answers, it clearly suggests the importance
of focusing on charter school governance in order to better understand the long-term
viability of the charter school reform effort.
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Appendix A
Board Meetings Attended

Board Meetings Attended
2008-2009 School Year
February 4, 2008
March 3, 2008
April 7, 2008
May 5, 2008
June 2, 2008
June 30, 2008
2009-2010 School Year
October 6, 2008
December 1, 2008
January 5, 2009
February 2, 2009
March 2, 2009
April 6, 2009
June 2009
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Analysis of Interview Guide and Rationale for Each Question
Interview Questions
Personal Background
How did you get involved
with the school? How
long have you served on
the BOD?

Justification
This information was important for understanding how the board
was constituted, and for determining what attracted individuals to
become members of the board (commitment to mission, parental
connection, connection to board member, etc).

What do you do
professionally? How, in
your mind, does this
connect with the work of
the BOD?

This question attempts to capture the skill-set of the board of
trustees, with an eye toward better understanding both areas of
strength and weakness on the board.

Role of the Board of
Directors

This category and its related questions emerged primarily from
the non-profit and charter school governance literature, although
also from observations at board meetings that suggested some
confusion both among different constituent groups and among the
board itself.
This question attempts to capture the perceptions of BOD
members about their own role, as well as in other interviews gain
a sense of best practices about BOD operations or perceptions of
other community members about this role. Observations of
meetings and the literature suggest that there is often confusion or
differing perceptions about this role.
This question attempts to further understand how BOD members
and other interview subjects perceive the role of the BOD. By
asking about the role vis a vis other roles I am trying to discern
how people distinguish these roles and if they have a clear sense
of how the roles diverge and intersect.

What role do you think a
charter school board of
directors should play?

How do you think the
BOD role connects with
the role of other
constituent groups: school
district, school
administration,
faculty/staff, parents
How closely has the role
that the BOD has played
during the early years
matched your
expectations for an
effective charter school
BOD?
What areas have been
strengths for this Board?
Weaknesses?

This question attempts to capture board perceptions of the
group's efficacy. It is yet another way to better understand what
role the board thinks it should play and, particularly given the
tumultuous events of the year, offers an opportunity to get insight
into what board members see as strengths and weaknesses of the
group.
This question, while not always asked, allowed development of
the previous answer and was a more direct means of getting at the
issue.
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SDMS's Early Years

SDMS's original decision
to become a charter
school occurred at a time
when the school had to
undergo a dramatic
transformation. What
benefits were there to
SDMS for its decision to
adopt a charter school
structure?
How would you
characterize the school's
early years? What were
the school's biggest
successes? Biggest
challenges?
Did anything surprise you
in the school's early
years?
Autonomy and
Accountability

At the heart of the charter
school concept, is the
notion that schools will
receive greater autonomy
in exchange for increased
accountability. What
types of autonomy do you
think SDMS has gained
through this bargain?
How does the SDMS
Board of Directors hold
the school accountable?
How does it determine if
the school is fulfilling its
mission and meeting its
performance targets?

This category was intended to capture some of the institutional
memory and to better understand the rationale for becoming a
conversion charter school. Parts of this category were not asked
of all board members, as not every member had been an original
member of the board.
This question attempted to determine people's perspective on the
decision by SDMS to become a charter school. Part of the
question was an underlying interest in how well people could
articulate a rationale for the decision. A well-articulated rationale
and something that was consistent across different people would
suggest a clear founding story and a shared understanding of the
school's original mission and vision.

This was intended to reveal challenges and success of the early
years. These answers might offer insight into some of the issues
currently affecting the school, as well as suggest if those issues
have changed over time. Since I was not present in the early
years, I thought it was also important to learn a little about the
early history.
This was intended to uncover topics that I might not have thought
about, as well as gain insight into any surprises that arose as part
of the transition to a charter school.
This was a key category that forced respondents to move beyond
the abstract notions of the role of the board and to review what
the board actually did. The terms are directly from the literature
on charter schools, as well as much of the public debate
surrounding charter schools.
This question and the ensuing question were an effort to see how
well the board members understood the purported advantages of
charter schools and whether they saw evidence of those
advantages in the operation of the school.

This question, in addition to unpacking board understanding of
charter schools, also pointed to the heart of the fiduciary role of a
non-profit board of directors. Did the board understand that role
and was it consciously playing it?

145
This question was an effort to consider the board's strategic and
Does the school have a
generative
roles and to determine what, if any, efforts were being
clear vision? How is that
made in these areas. It was also an effort to indirectly unpack the
vision shaped? Who is
relationship between the executive director and the board.
responsible for creating
and sustaining that vision?
Relationship with the
School District
During the last year,
several key issues have
arisen at board meetings
concerning the district.
Can you explain your
understanding of these
issues and what role, if
any, the BOD has played
in helping to resolve
them? - the lack of a
Memorandum of
Understanding (MOU)
between the district and
the school; - the decision
about whether or not to
stay within the school
district special education
local plan area (SELPA)
or seek another option
outside the district; - the
battle to obtain adequate
facilities from the school
district to support the
school's programs

This category emerged during the early meetings, as it became
clear that the management of this relationship was a key
challenge for the school.
This question was an effort to better understand the particular
details of the issues between the school district and the school, as
well as gain a sense of how well individual board members
understood these issues. It also offered an opportunity to
understand how individual board members played a role in the
resolution of these issues.

How would you
This question is connected to the issues that had arisen at the
characterize the
meetings - and is also a key issue addressed in the charter school
relationship between KLA literature.
and the school district?
Are there ways that the
This question attempted to gain insight from a board perspective
Board of Directors could
of their role vis a vis these issues. It also provided another
better manage the
opportunity to learn about specific actions that board members
relationship with the
took, or didn't take, that might have helped resolve these issues.
school district?

146
Relationship with
Partner University
One of the biggest
conflicts during the past
year has revolved around
the relationship between
USD and KLA. How
would you characterize
the relationship between
the two partner
organizations?
What benefits could each
side take away from this
partnership?

What role should the
BOD play in managing
this partnership?
Why, in your opinion, has
the relationship been so
challenging?
What do you think should
happen to the partnership?

Fundraising

At several meetings,
people have noted that
this is not a fundraising
board. To your mind,
what does that mean?
What, if anything, should
the BOT do about that?
How does the conflict
over fundraising connect
with broader concerns
about the BOT?

This was a major issue throughout the year and thus became a
key topic to address in interviews.
This was an effort to gain insight into board perspectives on this
issue. The open-ended nature of this question was intended to
elicit stories and information that might add to the information
that was already gleaned from board meetings.

This question came directly out of board meetings, where it
became apparent that it was not clear to different groups what the
value of the relationship was. The hope was that this question
would reveal different perceptions about the benefits of the
relationship.
This question went to the heart of board governance - did the
board have a role in helping to manage this relationship? It also
provided an opportunity for board members to mention things
they had done in order to help resolve these issues.
A direct question intended to gain different perspectives on this
conflict.
An important question which made it clear that the future of the
partnership was not preordained. The question gave board
members an opportunity to build on their previous answers and
assess if, in the end, the partnership was worth preserving.
This is a key role on many non-profit boards, thus a logical topic
to raise with a board. In addition, this came up at several board
meetings, thus offering an opportunity to ask questions and better
understand the reality of the situation.
An effort to understand what people thought was meant by
comments made at board meetings. It also raised the question of
whether or not the board should consider this a major issue
moving forward.

This question was an effort to see if board members thought the
fundraising concerns were part of broader concerns within the
community about the partnership and the efficacy of the board, or
if they were simply part of the typical non-profit development
challenge.

147
Community and
Organizational Context

How has the community
continued to be involved
in SDMS's development?

On the website, the
history mentions that
people felt that SDMS
was "My school." Do
people still think of it as
"My School?" Why or
why not?
How familiar are you with
the community
surrounding Keiller?

What is the community
like? Who lives here?

This is a key topic at charter schools, as the suggestion is often
made that charter schools offer increased community
involvement. These questions were an effort to build on
observations at the board meeting and gain a better sense of the
degree of community involvement and the role of the board in
encouraging these connections.
This question was an effort to gain insight into how the
involvement of the community has shifted over time. The
question presumed early involvement, based on knowledge of the
school's early years, and thus was probing to see if that
involvement was still true.
This question, similar to the previous question, was an effort to
see how the sense of community has evolved over time.

This question was an effort to see how well board members knew
the community. One of the issues on many boards is that
members do not have a strong connection to the community. In
addition, during the study, there was a perception that a deficit
model of the community existed. One way to find out about that
was to see how people described the community.
This question, similar to the previous question, attempted to see
how well members of the board knew the community.

